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ABSTRACT
Moulaye, Mohamed Alassane. M.S., Department of Economics, Wright State University, 
2005. The Impact of Income Inequality on Carbon Dioxide Emissions (CO?) and the 
COi-GDP link.
This paper examines the impact of income inequality on carbon dioxide emissions and 
the relationship between CO2 emissions and GDP using panel data. It initially examines 
the relationship between income and environmental degradation without introducing the 
inequality variable1, but then examines how inequality affects CO2 emissions and their 
relationship with economic growth.
Relying on the linear functional form equations of the levels and log models, this 
paper finds evidence that support specifications which assume the constancy of the 
relationship between per capita C02 emissions and per capita GDP. The results of the 
cubic functional form equations of the log models (for the FE) are consistent with a cubic 
relationship between per capita C02 emissions and per capita income. The inequality 
variables are statistically non-different from zero, denoting that income inequality has no 
causal effect on CO2 emissions.
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I. Introduction
In the 1970’s, when the world experienced two oil supply crises, there was
widespread concern about oil depletion. This concern, if not baseless, was certainly
premature. Early in the Twenty-First century, the world is concerned that the excessive
use of fossil fuels along with biomass fuels, may contribute to costly, disruptive climate
change from CO2 emissions. This concern is supported by a substantial and growing body
of scientific evidence (IPCC, 1995, 2000). In 1972, the Conference of Stockholm on
Development and Environment raised concerns about global warming. Twenty years
later, at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the United Nations requested governments to
reconsider their economic development rates either to stop or to reduce environmental
degradation (U.N., 1992). Many scientists agree that anthropogenic emissions of CO2 and
other trace atmospheric gases exceed the capacity of the biosphere to absorb these gases
without destabilizing the earth’s climate.
“A warming signal has penetrated into the world's oceans over the past 40 
years. The signal is complex, with a vertical structure that varies widely by 
ocean; it cannot be explained by natural internal climate variability or solar 
and volcanic forcing, but is well simulated by two anthropogenically 
forced climate models.” Barnett et al. (2005)
Barnett et al. (2005) attest that it is of human origin. Their finding is robust to 
observational sampling and model differences. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) 1995 report concluded that human activities have considerably increased 
the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (IPCC, 1995); hence, they have a
1
discemable impact on climate. That report constituted the basis of negotiations over the 
Kyoto Protocol. Along the same lines, the IPCC 2000 report attests that “the primary 
factors underlying anthropogenic climate change are similar to those for most 
environmental and socio-economic issues that is, economic growth, broad technological 
changes, life style patterns, demographic shifts (population size, age structure, and 
migration)”. Consequently, there is an increasing international pressure for an aggressive 
program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a more sustainable level. Burning fossil 
fuels causes 85 percent of the anthropogenic CO2 emissions (Schmalensee R., 1993), and 
CO2 is currently the most important greenhouse gas and is responsible for 55 percent of 
the emissions (Lashoff and Tippah, 1990). In 1997, the Kyoto protocol urged rich 
countries to reduce their CO2 emissions below the 1990 level by 2012. The U.S. and 
Australia refused to ratify the protocol, asserting that it would slow their economic 
development, raise their unemployment rates, and lower their standards of living. While 
this assertion is debatable, reducing CO2 emissions while maintaining or expending 
humanity’s standard of living is a big challenge for policy makers. Some economists 
argue that reducing inequality by redistributing income from rich to poor countries will 
increase environmental degradation.
In this context, it is vitally important to shed some light on the relationship 
between environmental quality and economic development. This paper contributes to an 
extensive literature on the influence of income growth and its distribution on 
environmental degradation. Since the 1990s, the relationship between income and 
environmental degradation has attracted much attention in the literature. In the early 
1990s, many authors found an inverted-U shape relationship between income and several
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indices of air and water pollution (Panayotou, 1993; Shafik, 1994; Selden and Song, 
1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995). This inverted-U shape relationship has been 
referred to as an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) . In recent years, the literature on 
the EKC has grown and is attempting to overcome the limitations of the original EKC 
studies by using new data sets, new functional forms and more refined econometric 
models. Literature on the relationship between per capita income level and environmental 
degradation reveal clear patterns. Environmental outcomes rise for low levels of per 
capita income and decline for higher levels of per capita income. One reason for this 
inverted U-shaped relation put forward by Heerink et al. (2001) “is that the so-called 
‘scale effect’, capturing the simple intuition that more output, ceteris paribus, results in 
more adverse effects for the environment, is (partly) offset by the ‘composition effect’ 
(referring to possible changes in the methods of production)”. Andreoni and levinson 
(1998) put forward another reason that derived directly from the technological link 
between consumption and pollution abatement.
A few studies (Scruggs, 1998; Torras and Boyce, 1998; Ravallion et al., 2000; 
Magnani, 2000) have examined the impact of inequality on the environment-income 
relationship but provide mixed or conflicting results. This paper attempts to contribute to 
this literature by looking at how economic factors influence environmental degradation 
using CO2 emissions as an indicator of environmental degradation. Specifically this paper 
looks at environmental degradation as a function of income and inequality using the Gini 
index as a measure of inequality.
2 EKC is named after Simon Kuznets who was the first to observe this kind of relationship between income 
an environmental degradation in 1955.
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This study will make use of panel data, which includes data on ninety countries 
over a five year period from 1998-2002. The sample size of countries in this study is 
constrained by the availability of the data on income inequality. The cross-sectional 
information reflects the differences between groups of countries, and the time-series 
information reflects changes within countries over time. The panel data approach allows 
me to take advantage of these different types of information. The next section (II) 
provides a brief literature review. Section III provides data sources. Section IV presents 
the theoretical model and methods. Section will discuss the results. Finally, Section VI 
presents a summary and conclusions.
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II. Literature review 
Several studies have analyzed the determinants of environmental degradation 
across countries. (Shafik, 1994; Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 1995; Grossman and Krueger, 
1995, Schmalensee et al., 1995; Galeotti and Lanza, 1999; Ravallion et al., 2000; Aldy 
2005). Ravallion et al. (2000) concluded that income distribution influences aggregate 
CO2 emissions. They also found that economic growth is usually associated with higher 
CO2 emissions. Therefore, an effort to control CO2 emissions may be achieved at the cost 
of reducing economic growth .
The application of EKC to CO2 emissions has raised important concerns. Indeed, 
some studies found an inverted-U shape relation between per capita income and CO2 
emissions, but with a peak well outside the income range in the samples studied4. Other 
studies suggest that the inverted-U shape relation reflects the fact that low-income 
economies are characterized by agriculture, while at the middle-income level economies 
move to emissions-intensive manufacturing, before moving to less emissions-intensive 
services at high-income level (Aldy, 2004).
Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) investigated the reduced-form (income dependent) 
relationship between per capita CO2 emissions and per capita GDP for a sample of 130 
countries over the period 1951-1986. They used panel data with a fixed country and year
3 Economic growth refers to the level of per capita income of a country vis-a-vis of another country.
4 The peak is often estimated to be around $5000 per capita; roughly the level of Mexico or Czech Republic 
(Boyce, 2003).
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specific model, and used a quadratic functional form. They found an out-of-sample5 
Kuznets curve: a closely linear curve but with an out-of-sample turning point equal to 
$35,428 per capita (in 1986 U.S. dollars). Grossman and Krueguer (1993) analyzed the 
effect of per capita GDP on various environmental indicators, using a random effects 
model. They found that there is no evidence of a relationship between economic growth 
and environmental degradation. Some studies use income data converted into purchasing 
power parity (PPP) while others use incomes at market exchange rates. The latter “better 
captures a country’s control over the world product and its power in trade networks” 
(Roberts and Grimes, 1997, p.192). However, using GDP according to PPP allows us to 
avoid the problem that the market exchange rate for a foreign currency is not a precise 
reflection of the purchasing power of that currency. For most environmental indicators, 
an inverted-U shape curve emerges, but with a turning point under $ 8,000 per capita (in 
1985 U.S. dollars). Along the same lines, Selden and Song (1994) found an inverted-U 
shape relation for the same pollutants, but with a turning point exceeding $ 8,000 per 
capita (in 1985 U.S. dollars). Kaufman et al. (1997) investigated the determinants of 
atmospheric SO2 concentrations, and found an inverted-U shape relation between SO2 
and per capita GDP. They used fixed and random effects models with a quadratic 
functional form and data for 23 countries between the years 1974-1989. Suri and 
Chapman (1998) also used a fixed effects model with quadratic functional form. They 
also use trade as a variable and found an EKC for per capita consumption of primary 
energy with a peak at $ 55,000 per capita (in 1985 U.S. dollars). Shafif and 
Bandyopadyay (1992) found that per capita CO2 emissions increase monotonically with
5 An out-of-sample turning point means that the turning point occurs out of the income range of the sample 
studied
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income growth. Along the same line, Shafik (1994) analyzed the relationship between 
various environmental indicators and per capita income for the period 1960-1990, and 
found several results among which the clear evidence of environmental Kuznets curves 
for deforestation, and SO2 , and a positive shape curve for CO2 . Hettige et al. (2000) 
examined the relationship between income and industrial water pollution using a panel 
data. They reject the EKC hypothesis.
According to Borghosi (2000), the first author to analyze the effect of inequality 
on environmental degradation was Boyce (1994). He hypothesized that greater income 
inequality may increase environmental degradation in two ways: First by its impact on 
the rate of time preference6, and second by the cost-benefit analysis of environmentally 
degrading activities. The argument for the first point is that a greater inequality increases 
the rate of environmental time preference (i.e. lowers concern for the earth’s future) for 
both poor and rich. On the one hand, when income inequality increases, the imperative 
for day to day survival compel the poor to overexploit natural resources that are the only 
capital available to them. On the other hand, “economic inequality is often associated 
with political instability and risk of revolts. This leads rich people, who should bear most 
of the financial costs of protecting the environment to prefer a policy of exploiting the 
environment and investing the returns abroad (where political uncertainty is lower) rather 
than investing in the defense of local natural resources.” (Borghosi, 2000).
Given the fact that wealth and power are highly correlated, rich people could 
influence political decisions on environmentally damaging projects based on the 
competition between the winners (those who benefit from such policy) and the losers
6 “The rate of time preference refers to the willingness to trade present benefits (or costs) for future benefits 
(or costs)” (Boyce, 1994).
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(those who bear the costs of environmentally destructive actions) (Boyce, 1994). The 
critics of Boyce’s hypothesis argue that there is no causal relationship between income 
inequality and environmental degradation. The assumption that income inequality affects 
environmental degradation via cost-benefit analysis is wrong. “Evidence indicates that 
better-off members of society tend to have greater environmental concerns than those 
with lower incomes” (Scruggs, 1998).
Many other authors dispute the nonlinearity in the relationship between 
environmental outcomes and per capita income. The concept of an inverted-U shape 
relationship is dependent on an economic model, which does not allow any feedback 
from the quality of the environment to production possibilities, and in which trade has no 
effect on environmental degradation (Stem et al., 1996). “The actual violation of these 
assumptions give rise to fundamental problems in estimating the parameters of an EKC” 
(Stem et al., 1996). The EKC argument is predominant because few people paid 
sufficient attention to econometric diagnostics. Indeed none of the early studies on EKC 
present diagnostic statistics of the regression residuals. Ekins (1997) raises the concern 
about different results found on the same pollutant by different researchers using different 
functional forms (logs vs. levels). Hence, the relationship if any is weak. The controversy 
over the EKC is due in part because the argument could be cast as a prescription for 
complacency. The interpretation of the original Kuznets curve seems to suggest that poor 
countries will focus on economic growth to resolve problems of poverty and downplay 
environmental concerns (Boyce, 2003).
According to Ravallion et al. (2000), the impact of inequality on environmental 
degradation is a priori ambiguous. Since the consumption of almost every good implies
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some emissions either directly (via consumption), or indirectly (via its production), each 
individual has an implicit demand function for carbon emissions7 (Ravallion et al., 2000). 
If poor people have a high marginal propensity to emit (MPE), then reducing inequality 
will increase carbon emissions, but if poor people have a lower MPE, then reducing 
inequality will lower carbon emissions. It is difficult to predict which of these two effects 
will prevail.
At the household level, there is evidence that both consumption and production 
influence environmental degradation. In poor countries, households are both consumers 
and producers. Hence, they affect the environment by their decisions on consumption and 
production as well. Many studies find an inverted-U shape relationship between 
environmental outcomes and income inequality at the household level (Godly et al., 
1997; Chaudhuri and Pfaff, 1998; Kahn, 1998).
Boyce (2003), studying the relationship between inequality and environmental 
protection, claims that this relationship is based on two distinct effects. First is the so- 
called political-economy effect. Redistributing income from rich to poor may affect 
society’s demand for environmental quality. If the relationship between income and 
environmental outcomes is concave, redistributing income from rich to poor will increase 
environmental damage. Inversely if the relationship between income and environmental 
outcomes is convex, redistributing income from rich to poor will decrease environmental 
damage. The second effect is known as the aggregation effect “The amount of 
environmental degradation per unit of income may vary systematically across households 
ranking by income. If so, the overall level of environmental degradation will reflect not 
only the country’s average income, but also the distribution of income across
7 The derivative of this demand function is the marginal propensity to emit (MPE).
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households” (Boyce, 2003). Based on the assumption that environmental quality is a 
normal good, Boyce (2003) asserts that “a redistribution of income from the poor to the 
rich will increase the demand of the rich but at the same time it will decrease the demand 
of the poor.” Depending on the demand-income relation, three cases can be observed on 
the net effect on demand (Figure. 1). If the demand for environmental quality increases 
with income at a constant rate, then changes in income inequality do not affect the 
demand for environmental quality. If the relationship demand-income is convex, then 
higher income inequality leads to higher total demand. If the relationship is concave, then 
higher income inequality leads to lower total demand. Hence, the argument regarding 
exactly how income inequality affects environmental quality is ambiguous and depends 
on the nature of the demand-income relationship.
Figure 1: Income and demand for environmental quality
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The CO2 emissions, the GDP and the population data are provided by the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). CO2 emissions from the consumption and 
flaring of fossil fuels, measured in million metric tons of carbon dioxide, are based on the 
consumption of petroleum, natural gas, and coal. GDP data are obtained by converting 
the GDP for each country measured in year 2000 foreign currency units to U.S. dollars 
using year 2000 annual average foreign currency market exchange rates . Theoretically, 
GDP should be converted by using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates to avoid the 
problem that the market exchange rate for a foreign currency is not a precise reflection of 
the purchasing power of that currency. In practice, finding agreeable PPP rates for some 
countries is often difficult. The population data is in millions. The data presented by EIA 
have been largely derived from published sources9.
8 1 U.S. 1985 dollars is equal to 1.60 U.S. 2000 dollars (BLS).
9 C02 data source: Estimated by the Office of Energy Markets and End Use, Energy Information 
Administration.
GDP data sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues. U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey o f Current Business, various issues. 
International Energy Agency, Energy Balances o f OECD Countries, various issues. Global Insight, 
Quarterly Review and Outlook - Asia and Oceania, Quarterly Review and Outlook - Emerging Europe, 
Quarterly Review and Outlook - Latin America and Caribbean, Quarterly Review and Outlook - Middle 
East and Africa, Quarterly Review and Outlook - Middle East and North Africa, and Quarterly Review and 
Outlook - Sub-Saharan Africa, various issues.
Population data sources: The United Nations, Monthly Bulletin o f Statistics, various issues. U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, International Data Base. International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics, various issues. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 
various, issues
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Although EIA has mandatory data collection authority for collecting information 
within the United States, it has no authority to require reporting of data from foreign 
countries. Since EIA does not have access to the statistical surveys of other countries, it 
is not able to develop error estimates or revision errors such as might be developed in 
ELA's domestic surveys. However, EIA attempts to identify and collect the best data 
available for foreign countries. The official national statistical reports of a country are 
usually the most authoritative sources, but they are not always available. Therefore, EIA 
also uses data from reputable secondary sources. The integrity of the data may be 
affected by many factors beyond EIA's control. Among these factors are a country's level 
of economic development, commitment to statistical programs and openness with 
information; nevertheless, these data appear to be the best information available from a 
single source.
The coverage of distributional data is quite uneven over time and countries, 
reflecting the availability of household-level survey data. The Gini index (see figurel) is 
by far the most widely available inequality index in existing data compilation, though 
observations are sporadic (Ravallion et al., 2000). Data on the Gini index are obtained 
from the World Bank’s Development Research Group10. These data are not strictly 
comparable across countries, because there are underlying differences in the type of 
survey data (Ravallion et al., 2000). Some surveys are done based on household incomes 
per capita, and some are done based on consumption expenditure. The fact that data on
10 The World Bank’s Development Research Group compiles the data on distribution by using primary 
household survey data obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments. 
Data for high-income economies are from the Luxembourg Income Study database.
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Gini index are not available for many countries reduces the number of countries used in 
this study to 9011 (see appendix A for countries and Gini table).





The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of a distribution. It is the ratio of 
the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect distribution divided by the area
11 The countries in the data set are: Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa- 
Rica, Cote-d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech-Rep., Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El-Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India 
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea Rep., Luxembourg, Macedonia, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, Uruguay, US, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe,
13
of the entire triangle. Consequently, it is a number between 0 and 1 with 0 representing 
perfect equality and 1 representing perfect inequality.
14
IV. Theoretical Model and Methods
The CO2 emissions are chosen as a proxy for environmental degradation, and per 
capita GDP and Gini index are chosen as independent variables. This paper only 
considers the reduced form of the EKC (income-dependent) model that can provide a 
dependence of aggregate CO2 emissions on the income distribution. An ongoing debate in 
the literature focuses on the use of the reduced form EKC. If the researcher omits 
explanatory variables such as literacy rate, urbanization, or political rights and civil 
liberties, then insights may be obscured into the causal mechanisms through which 
income affects the environment (Kaufman et al., 1998). However, adding such variables 
to the equation would mean that some of the potential links between income and the 
environment might not be reflected in the parameter estimates for the income variables 
because of potential multicollinearity. Most of the literature on EKC assumes that 
environmental degradation is a polynomial function of per capita income. However, the 
studies on the subject differ on a certain number of aspects:
First, the choice between linear and log model;
Second, the choice between quadratic and cubic functions;
Third, the choice of the specification (fixed effects, random effects, pooled 
ordinary least squares, etc...).
The choice between linear and log has been discussed in a number of econometric 
studies (McAleer, 1994).
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“On conceptual grounds the selection of either specification is not without 
implications: suffice to remember that the first model yields constant 
marginal effects and variable elasticities, while the second model does 
precisely the opposite; the log-linear model may appear to some 
researchers preferable because it yields steady-state growth paths or 
because it implies multiplicative, rather than additive, individual effects; 
the linear model is attractive because its computational simplicity, the 
(almost) immediate interpretability of some of its coefficients, and its 
temporal aggregability.” (Galeotto and Lanza, 1999a).
Since both linear and log models have advantages and inconveniences12, this study 
uses both of them as well as fixed (FE) and random effects (RE) specifications. The fixed 
effects model treats the country (pj) and the year (Q) dummy variables as part of the 
intercept, whereas the random effects model treats them as part of the error. If the 
explanatory variables are correlated to gi and Q, then the random effects model will be 
biased and inconsistent. This paper uses a Hausman specification test to test for 
inconsistency in the random effects estimates by comparing the fixed effects and the 
random effects slope parameters. If there is a significant difference between the slope 
parameters, the random effects model will produce biased estimators, the fixed effects 
model will then be preferred.
The pooled ordinary least square is not taken in consideration in this paper because it 
is assumed to be a specific case of random effects (Borghosi, 2000). When it comes to 
the choice between quadratic and cubic functions, most literature uses the quadratic form 
of specification. However, some studies prefer the cubic form because it “allows the 
third derivation to be non-zero” (Ravallion, 2000) and for some indicators, environmental 
degradation is best described by the cubic function (Shafik, 1994; Grossman and
12 Galeotti and Lanza (1999a) addressed the issue extensively.
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Krueger, 1995; Torras and Boyce, 1998) because it rises, then decreases and then rises 
again. This study will consider both the quadratic and the cubic forms of specifications.
In addition to the relation between environmental degradation and per capita GDP, 
this paper will address the income inequality effect on the environment. Two sets of 
models will be estimated:
Model 1: Relationship between C 0 2 and GDP (Random and fixed effects regression 
models)13.
Model I with variables in levels:
C02PC * = q> + QGDPPQt + pi + q + G
C02PC it = q> + Q GDPPCit + G GDPC2it + p; + Q + G
C02PC it = 0) + G GDPPCit + GGDPPC2it + QGDPPCG + pi + q + G
Model 1 with variables in log:
l c o 2pc  it = q> + QLGDPPCit + Pi + q + G
LCO2PC n = Q) + G LGDPPCit + G LGDPPC2it + \n + q + G
LCO2 PC n = G + GLGDPPCi, + G> LGDPPCit + G LGDPPC3it + p, + Q + G
13 Since the general form of RE equations and FE equations is the same, it is unnecessary to duplicate it.
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Model 2: Impact of inequality on CO2 emissions and C 0 2-GDP relationship
(Random and fixed effects regression models).
Model 2 with variables in levels:
C 02PC it= Q) + QGDPPQt + QGinijt + pj + q + q
CO2PC it = q, + q GDPPCit + q  GDPPC2it + q  Giniit + p; + Q + q
CO2PC a = Q) + G GDPPCit + QGDPPC2* + qGDPPC3it + Dt Giniit + p; + Q + Q
Model 2 with variables in log:
LC 02PC it = Q) + QLGDPPCit + q  Giniit + pt + Q + Qt
LCO2PC it = q  + q LGDPPCit + q  LGDPPC2it + q  Giniit + pi + q + q
l c o 2pc  it = q> + qLGDPPCit + q  l g d p p c^ + q  l g d p p c 3,, + q  Gimit + p; + q + q
where:
CO2PC it = Per capita carbon dioxide emissions,
LC02PC it = Logarithm of per capita carbon dioxide emissions,
GDPPCit = Per capita Gross Domestic Product (in thousand of U.S. 2000 dollars), 
GDPPC2it = Per capita Gross Domestic Product squared,
GDPPC3it = Per capita Gross Domestic Product in third power,
LGDPPCit = Logarithm of Per capita Gross Domestic Product,
LGDPPC2it = Logarithm of Per capita Gross Domestic Product squared,
LGDPPC3jt = Logarithm of Per capita Gross Domestic Product in third power,
Gini = Gini index,
Pi = country variable, 
q = time variable,
18
“r  = country index,
“t” = year index,
“Hii” is the intercept and “Qt” is the error term.
19
V. Results and Discussions
I start by examining the relationship between per capita carbon emissions and per 
capita GDP, when inequality is not taken into account. The estimates of the levels version 
of Model 1 are shown in the Tablel for both FE and RE models. Three different 
specifications have been tried for each model: linear, quadratic, and cubic. Since both RE 
and FE models are estimated I have performed the Hausman Test for each model. The 
Flausman test compares the coefficients of the RE model with those of the FE model. The 
null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the RE and FE models. If one does 
not reject the null hypothesis then it is appropriate to use the RE model. However, 
rejection of the null hypothesis implies that one should use the FE model. Statistically, it 
is always good to use FE with panel data (they always give consistent results) but they 
may not be the most efficient models to run. RE will give better P-values as they are a 
more efficient estimator, so RE should be run if it is statistically justifiable to do so. The 
Hausman test provides insights of a more efficient model against a less efficient but 
consistent model to make sure that the more efficient model also gives consistent results.
The estimated coefficients for the model along with the Hausman specification 
tests are shown in Table 1. In the case of the simple linear model we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients are different and hence we use the results from the 
RE model. These results show that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between per capita income and per capita CO2 emissions. This finding is
20
consistent with previous studies of the EKC, which have generally found a positive 
relationship between income and CO2 emissions.
Next I consider the quadratic specification, which attempts to capture a non-linear 
relationship between per capita income and CO2 emissions. Looking at the RE model it 
appears that there is a non-linear relationship. Specifically it appears that as income goes 
up CO2 emissions are increasing at a decreasing rate. However, the RE model is rejected 
by the Hausman test for the quadratic functional form. Therefore we must consider the 
FE model. In the FE model the quadratic term is statistically not different from zero, so it 
appears that there is only a linear relationship between per capita CO2 emissions and per 
capita income. These first two results confirm the argument that CO2 emissions increase 
monotonically with income growth, put forward by many authors among which Shafik 
and Bandyopadyay (1992), and Shafik (1994).
21
Table 1: Model 1 with variables in levels
RE FE









































R-square 0.3006 0.3171 0.3798 0.9968 0.9968 0.9971
Hausman test 0=0.26 0=6.62
Note: The * indicates that the estimate coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level or better.
Lets now consider the cubic specification. Here, the Hausman test is undefined 
because of the large variance of the data when the cubic term of per capita GDP is used. 
The data become approximately zero for some countries, and high for others forming
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clusters. The assumption that one of the estimators is efficient (i.e., has minimal 
asymptotic variance) is violated; consequently, the Hausman test is undefined 
(http://www. stata.com/help.cgi?hausman). In the absence of Hausman test, the FE model 
is more likely to be considered, however, the result of the RE model is consistent to the 
one of the FE model. Considering the latter, it appears that as income grows CO2  
emissions are increasing at a decreasing rate up to 37.66 in thousands of per capita U.S. 
2000 dollars (23.53 in thousands of per capita U.S 1985 dollars), approximately the level 
of Denmark, and then increasing at an increasing rate thereafter. This result is in 
conformity with the one of Grossman and Krueger (1991). Figure 3 represents the graph 
of the cubic.
Figure 3: Levels cubic equation of C02-GDP with FE model
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
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The estimates of the log version of model 1 are shown in the Table 2 for both FE 
and RE models. Here, the Hausman specification tests results indicate for all the 
functional forms (linear, quadratic, and cubic) that there is a significant difference 
between the slope parameters, and that the RE will produce biased estimators. Hence, the 
FE can be estimated consistently for both functional forms. Like for the levels model, the 
linear term for income is always positive and statistically significant for the log model. In 
the FE models with both the quadratic and cubic terms, both log-quadratic and log-cubic 
functional forms are statistically insignificant. This suggests that there is a positive 
relationship between per capita CO2 emissions and per capita. Figure 4 presents the graph 
of the log cubic equation with FE model.




12 -  
10 - 
8 - 




0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
24
Table 2: Model 1 with variables in log
RE FE









































R-square 0.4776 0.5582 0.5593 0.9986 0.9986 0.9986
Hausman test □=10.02 □=68.33 □=64.74
Let us now examine the effect of inequality on CO2 emissions and the CO2- 
income relationship by adding the Gini index as a regressor. The results of the levels 
version of Model 2 are shown in the Table 3 for both FE and RE models.
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Table 3: Model 2 with variables in levels
RE FE






















































R-square 0.3013 0.3184 0.3817 0.9968 0.9968 0.9971
Hausman test □=0.39 □=6.73
The introduction of the Gini index as an explanatory variable does not change the shape 
of the relationship between per capita CO2 emissions and per capita income. By 
comparing Table 1 and Table 3, we see that beside the intercepts that are less statistically
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significant, the introduction of the inequality variable does not have a significant impact 
on the estimate parameters. The Hausman specification tests in Table 3 produce the same 
results as in Table 1. Even the point of inflection is about the same (37.73). 
Consequently, the interpretation of the relationship between per capita CO2 emissions and 
per capita income will not be different from Model 1 to Model 2 for variables in levels.
Turning to the inequality variable (Gini), I immediately note that this variable is 
always statistically insignificant. This seems to suggest that inequality has no explanatory 
power for CO2 emissions as argued by Scruggs (1998). It could be argued that the high 
standard error of the Gini index might be determined by the existence of multicollinearity 
in the model. For this reason, I regress the Gini variable on per capita GDP, per capita 
GDP-square, and per capita GDP-cube. The estimated results are statistically 
insignificant at the 5% level, ruling out the multicollinearity argument. It could also be 
argued that the inequality impact on C02 emissions might have opposite signs in rich and 
poor countries that tend to counterbalance in the panel, which could explain the non­
significance of the Gini index.
The results of the log version of Model 2 are shown in the Table 4 for both FE 
and RE models. Again, the introduction of the Gini variable does not affect the 
relationship between log per capita CO2 emissions and log per capita income. The results 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between per capita income and CO2 emissions 
and that inequality does not appear to be related to the level of CO2 emissions since none 
of the coefficients on the Gini coefficient are statistically significant.
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Table 4: Model 2 with variables in log
RE FE






















































R-square 0.4764 0.5695 0.5707 0.9986 0.9986 0.9986
Hausman test 0=10.74 0=71.04 0=67.43
28
VI. Conclusions
This paper explored the relationship between environmental degradation, 
economic growth and income inequality within the framework of the environmental 
Kuznets curve literature. For this purpose, it first investigates the relationship between 
per capita CO2 emissions and per capita income when inequality is left out, and then 
examines how inequality affects CO2 emissions and their relationship with economic 
growth.
Despite the large and increasing number of studies on the EKC, only a limited 
number have investigated the impact of income inequality on the environment. Many of 
these studies used the RE model. However, the RE model assumes that individual 
specific effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Hence, the results 
obtained in the literature may heavily depend on whether we use RE model or FE model. 
This study account for both models and uses the Hausman specification test to see the 
suitable one for a particular functional form equation. Relying on the linear functional 
form equations of the levels and log models, this paper finds evidence that supports 
specifications, which assume the constancy of the relationship between per capita C02 
emissions and per capita GDP. The results of the cubic functional form equations of the 
log models (for the FE) are consistent with a cubic relationship between per capita C02 
emissions and per capita income. As income goes up CO2 emissions are increasing at a 
decreasing rate up to about 37.66 in thousands of per capita U.S. 2000 dollars,
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approximately the level of Denmark, and then increasing at an increasing rate thereafter. 
Consistently with the cross-country relationship, this paper argues that inequality within 
countries should also matter to CO2 emissions. However, the inequality variables are 
statistically insignificant for both models. There are some possible explanations for this 
outcome: first there is no necessary causal relation between income inequality and 
environmental degradation, as argued by Scruggs (1998), and second, there is a 
counterbalance between the positive and the negative impact of inequality on 
environmental degradation. “This could occur since poor people contribute less to 
pollution by consuming less than the rich (hence lower inequality reduces emissions), but 
they also use energy less efficiently than the latter (thus lower inequality increases 
emissions).” Borghosi S. (2000).
The findings of my study agree with previous studies on the subject. One potential 
weakness of my approach is that the Gini variables are statistically insignificant. Further 
investigation will be needed to examine the impact of inequality on environmental 
degradation. For this purpose, future studies should investigate the relationship between 
environment and income inequality in single-country studies to see whether such 
relationship changes at different income levels.
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Appendix A- List of Countries in the study with their Gini
VIII. Appendices:
World Regions GINI Index
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
North America 
U.S.A 40.8 40.8 40.8 40.8 40
Canada 31.5 31.5 31.5 31.5 33.'
Mexico 57.3 51.9 53.1 51.9 54.6
Centra! & South America
Brazil 60 59.1 60.7 59.1 59.1
Chile 56.5 57.5 56.7 57.5 57/
Colombia 57.1 57.1 57.1 57.1 57. S
Costa-Rica 47 45.9 45.9 45.9 46.5
Dominican Republic 48.7 47.4 47.4 47.4 4 7 /
Ecuador 43.7 43.7 43.7 43.7 43
El Salvador 52.3 50.8 52.2 50.8 53 5
Guatemala 55.8 55.8 55.8 59.9 48 3
Honduras 53.7 59 56.3 59 55
Jamaica 36.4 36.4 37.94 37.94 36
Nicaragua 50.3 60.3 60.3 60.3 55.1
Paraguay 59.1 57.7 57.7 57.7 56.8
Peru 46.2 46.2 46.2 46.2 49.8
Philippines 46.2 46.2 46.2 46.1 46.1
Trinidad & Tobago 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3
Venezuela 48.8 48.8 49.5 49.1 49.1
Bolivia 42 58.9 44.7 44.7 44.7
Uruguay 42.3 42.3 42.3 44.8 44.6
Europe
Albania 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2 282
Norway 25.8 25.8 25.8 25.8 25.8
Portugal 35.6 35.6 35.6 36.5 36
Spain 32.5 32.5 32.5 32.5 32.5
Austria 23.1 23.1 31 30.5 30
Belgium 25 25 28.7 25 25
Bulgaria 28.3 26.4 26.4 31.9 31.9
Czech Republic 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4
Denmark 24.7 24.7 24.7 24.7 24.7
Finland 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.6 26.9
France 32.7 32.7 32.7 32.7 32.
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World Regions GINI Index
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Germany 30 30 30 38.2 28.3
Ireland 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9 35.9
Italy 27.3 27.3 27.3 36 27.3
Luxembourg 26.9 26.9 26.9 30.8 30.8
Netherlands 32.6 32.6 32.6 32.6 32.6
New Zealand 43.9 43.9 43.9 36.2 36 <
Norway 25.8 25.8 25.8 25.8 25 3
Poland 32.9 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6
Romania 28.2 28.2 31 32.3 32
Russia 48.7 48.7 48.7 45.6 45.5
Slovakia 19.5 19.5 19.5 25.8 25.8
Sweden 25 25 25 25 ?5
Switzerland 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33/
U.K. 36.1 36.1 36.8 36 36
Croatia 29 29 29 29 ; '
Greece 32.7 32.7 32.7 35.4 35.4
Turkey 41.5 41.5 41.5 40 40
Macedonia 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2
Hungary 
Middle East
30.8 24.4 24.4 24.4 24.4
Iran 43 43 43 43 43
Jordan 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.4
Israel
Africa
35.5 35.5 38.1 35.5 35.5
Mozambique 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.6
Niger 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5
Algeria 35.3 35.3 35.3 35.3 35.3
Burkina-Faso 48.2 48.2 55.1 48.2 48.2
Cote-d’lvoire 46.5 46.5 46.5 46.5 45.2
Egypt 28.9 28.9 28.9 34.4 34.4
Ethiopia 40 40 40 48.6 30
Ghana 39.6 39.6 40.7 39.6 30
Mali 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.5 50.3
Nigeria 50.6 50.6 50.6 50.6 50.6
Senegal 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3
South Africa 59.3 59.3 59.3 59.3 59.3
Tunisia 40.2 41.7 41.5 41.7 39.8
Zambia 49.8 52.6 52.6 52.6 52.6
Zimbabwe 56.8 56.8 50.1 56.8 56 8
Burundi 33.3 33.3 42.5 33.3 33.'
Cameroon 44.6 44.6 44.6 44.6 44.6
Malawi 50.3 50.3 50.3 50.3 50.3
Kenya 44.5 44.5 44.9 44.5 44.5
Morocco 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5
Tanzania 38.2 38.2 38.2 38.2 38.2
35
World Regions GINI Index
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Asia & Oceania
China 40.3 40.3 40.3 40.3 44.7
Australia 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 35 -
Bangladesh 33.6 33.6 33.6 31.8 31 '
Cambodia 40.4 40.4 40.4 40.4 40 -
Hong Kong 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43/
India 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8
Indonesia 36.5 31.7 31.7 30.3 32 -
Japan 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.-2
Korea Republic 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6 31 6
Malaysia 48.5 49.2 49.2 49.2 47.5
Nepal 36.5 36.7 36.7 36.7 36
Pakistan 31.2 31.2 31.2 33 33
Singapore 42.5 42.5 42.5 42.5 42.5
Sri Lanka 34.4 34.4 34.4 34.4 34.4
Thailand 41.4 41.4 41.4 43.2 43.2
Vietnam 36.1 36.1 36.1 36.1 36.1
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Appendix B- SAS Results





Number of Cross Sections 90













Variance Component for Cross Sections 0.555946
Vari ance Component for Time Seri es 0
Variance Component for Error 0.004928






























Number of Cross Sections 90












F Test for No Fixed Effects 
Num DF Den DF F value Pr > F






vari abl e DF Estimate
Standard
Error
CSl 1 -0.48746 0.0627
CS2 1 0.305547 0.1002
CS3 1 0.838086 0.3094
CS4 1 -0.21598 0.3384
CSS 1 -1.40749 0.0601
CS6 1 0.370629 0.3324
CS7 1 -0.38007 0.0613
CS8 1 -0.56065 0.1771
CS9 1 1.153951 0.0909
CS10 1 -1.99961 0.0910
CSll 1 -2.0412 0.1407
CS12 1 -2.88132 0.0768
CS13 1 -1.06372 0.0490
CS14 1 0.800529 0.3089
CS15 1 -0.07509 0.1961
CS16 1 0.580823 0.0531
CS17 1 -0.51471 0.1238
CS18 1 -0.85339 0.1619
CS19 1 -1.23934 0.0528
CS20 1 0.317607 0.1713
CS21 1 0.991108 0.1916
CS22 1 0.007368 0.3516
CS23 1 -0.15742 0.1133
CS24 1 -0.1351 0.0913
CS25 1 0.105418 0.0737
CS26 1 -0.8395 0.1035
CS27 1 -2.20499 0.1457
CS28 1 0.009255 0.3340
CS29 1 -0.32933 0.3302
CS30 1 0.026607 0.3373
CS31 1 -1.33886 0.0528
CS32 1 0.413043 0.2614
CS33 1 -0.86593 0.0934
CS34 1 -0.49598 0.0478
CS35 1 -0.05763 0.3118
CS36 1 0.403895 0.1912
CS37 1 -0.05151 0.0470
CS38 1 -0.14402 0.0629
t Value Pr > |t| Label
-7.77 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 1
3.05 0.0025 Cross Sectional 
Effect 2
2.71 0.0071 Cross Sectional 
Effect 3
-0.64 0.5238 Cross Sectional 
Effect 4
-23.43 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 5
1.12 0.2656 Cross Sectional 
Effect 6
-6.20 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 7
-3.17 0.0017 Cross Sectional
Effect 8
12.69 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 9
-21.98 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 10
-14.50 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 11
-37.52 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 12
-21.71 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 13
2.59 0.0100 Cross Sectional 
Effect 14
-0.38 0.7019 Cross Sectional 
Effect 15
10.94 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 16
-4.16 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 17
-5.27 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 18
-23.47 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 19
1.85 0.0645 Cross Sectional 
Effect 20
5.17 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 21
0.02 0.9833 Cross Sectional 
Effect 22
-1.39 0.1654 Cross Sectional 
Effect 23
-1.48 0.1398 Cross Sectional 
Effect 24
1.43 0.1534 Cross Sectional 
Effect 25
-8.11 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 26
-15.14 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 27
0.03 0.9779 Cross Sectional
Effect 28
-1.00 0.3192 Cross Sectional 
Effect 29
0.08 0.9372 Cross Sectional 
Effect 30
-25.34 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 31
1.58 0.1150 Cross Sectional 
Effect 32
-9.28 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 33
-10.38 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 34
-0.18 0.8535 Cross Sectional 
Effect 35
2.11 0.0354 Cross Sectional 
Effect 36
-1.10 0.2737 Cross Sectional 
Effect 37
-2.29 0.0226 Cross Sectional
Effect 38
38
CS39 1 0.821837 0.1105 7.44 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 39
CS40 1 0.163918 0.3228 0.51 0.6119 Cross Sectional 
Effect 40
CS41 1 0.348547 0.2866 1.22 0.2247 Cross Sectional
Effect 41
CS42 1 -0.03302 0.3014 -0.11 0.9128 Cross Sectional
Effect 42
CS43 1 0.609657 0.1184 5.15 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 43
CS44 1 -0.26595 0.3631 -0.73 0.4644 Cross Sectional 
Effect 44
CS45 1 0.462245 0.0928 4.98 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 45
CS46 1 -1.12327 0.0647 -17.37 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 46
CS47 1 0.372892 0.2617 1.43 0.1550 Cross Sectional
Effect 47
CS48 1 0.418953 0.3831 1.09 0.2749 Cross Sectional
Effect 48
CS49 1 0.844473 0.0943 8.95 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 49
CS50 1 -2.03151 0.1257 -16.16 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 50
CS51 1 0.377176 0.1792 2.10 0.0361 Cross Sectional
Effect 51
CS52 1 -2.60353 0.0946 -27.53 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 52
CS53 1 0.200054 0.1599 1.25 0.2117 Cross Sectional
Effect 53
CS54 1 -0.53703 0.0855 -6.28 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 54
CS55 1 -2.04757 0.1009 -20.30 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 55
CS56 1 -1.63161 0.0880 -18.54 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 56
CS57 1 0.466776 0.3328 1.40 0.1616 Cross Sectional
Effect 57
CS58 1 0.238959 0.2900 0.82 0.4105 Cross Sectional
Effect 58
CS59 1 -0.28598 0.0485 -5.90 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 59
CS60 1 -1.64407 0.1148 -14.32 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 60
CS61 1 -0.63708 0.0591 -10.79 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 61
CS62 1 -0.12729 0.3535 -0.36 0.7190 Cross Sectional
Effect 62
CS63 1 -0.33062 0.0468 -7.07 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 63
CS64 1 -1.16679 0.1012 -11.53 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 64
CS65 1 -0.79962 0.1247 -6.41 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 65
CS66 1 -0.59837 0.0734 -8.16 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 66
CS67 1 0.838216 0.1702 4.92 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 67
CS68 1 0.027516 0.2606 0.11 0.9160 Cross Sectional
Effect 68
CS69 1 0.828948 0.0919 9.02 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 69
CS70 1 1.464128 0.1259 11.63 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 70
CS71 1 -0.9378 0.0446 -21.02 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 71
CS72 1 1.112795 0.3227 3.45 0.0006 Cross Sectional
Effect 72
CS73 1 0.750084 0.1732 4.33 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 73
CS74 1 0.991039 0.1654 5.99 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 74
CS75 1 0.067053 0.2852 0.24 0.8143 Cross Sectional
Effect 75
CS76 1 -0.91465 0.0560 -16.33 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 76
CS77 1 -0.48556 0.3375 -1.44 0.1511 Cross Sectional
Effect 77
CS78 1 -0.65811 0.3671 -1.79 0.0739 Cross Sectional
Effect 78
CS79 1 -2.00906 0.1036 -19.38 <.0001 Cross Sectional
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Effect 79
CS80 1 0.082835 0.1372 0.60 0.5464 Cross Sectional
Effect 80
CS81 1 1.774231 0.1868 9.50 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 81
CS82 1 -0.16617 0.1289 -1.29 0.1983 Cross Sectional
Effect 82
CS83 1 0.026548 0.1416 0.19 0.8514 Cross Sectional
Effect 83
CS84 1 0.142621 0.3066 0.47 0.6421 Cross Secti onal
Effect 84
CS85 1 0.72276 0.3358 2.15 0.0321 Cross Sectional
Effect 85
CS86 1 -0.86172 0.2031 -4.24 <.0001 Cross Secti onal
Effect 86
CS87 1 0.698282 0.1508 4.63 <.0001 Cross Secti onal
Effect 87
CS88 1 -0.44795 0.0571 -7.85 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 88
CS89 1 -1.47076 0.0555 -26.49 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 89
TSl 1 -0.0039 0.0121 -0.32 0.7470 Time Series
Effect 1
TS2 1 0.008666 0.0114 0.76 0.4475 Time Series
Effect 2
TS3 1 0.00407 0.0106 0.38 0.7021 Time Seri es
Effect 3
TS4 1 0.007154 0.0105 0.68 0.4961 Time Series
Effect 4
Intercept 1 0.406215 0.0539 7.53 <.0001 Intercept
Igdppc 1 0.544917 0.0830 6.56 <.0001




Number of Cross Sections 90













variance Component for Cross Sections 0.353417
vari ance Component for Time Seri es 0
variance Component for Error 0.004911








































Number of Cross Sections 90
Time Series Length 5
Fit statisties
SSE 1.7385 DFE 354
MSE 0.0049 Root MSE 0.0701
R-Square 0.9986
F Test for No Fixed Effects 
Num DF Den DF F value Pr > F
93 354 337.64 <.0001
Parameter Estimates
Standard
variable DF Estimate Error t value Pr > |t| Label
CSl 1 -0.46852 0.0639 -7.34 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 1
CS2 1 0.324981 0.1009 3.22 0.0014 Cross Sectional 
Effect 2
CS3 1 0.599221 0.3476 1.72 0.0856 Cross Sectional 
Effect 3
CS4 1 -0.52294 0.3953 -1.32 0.1867 Cross Sectional 
Effect 4
CS5 1 -1.43943 0.0637 -22.61 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 5
CS6 1 0.078455 0.3850 0.20 0.8386 Cross Sectional 
Effect 6
CS7 1 -0.36132 0.0625 -5.78 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 7
CS8 1 -0.5883 0.1778 -3.31 0.0010 Cross Sectional 
Effect 8
CS9 1 1.174882 0.0918 12.79 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 9
CS10 1 -2.07705 0.1045 -19.87 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 10
csll 1 -2.20507 0.1781 -12.38 <.0001 Cross sectional 
Effect 11
CS12 1 -2.93759 0.0854 -34.40 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 12
CS13 1 -1.05214 0.0495 -21.24 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 13
CS14 1 0.562559 0.3470 1.62 0.1059 Cross Sectional 
Effect 14
CS15 1 -0.12301 0.1983 -0.62 0.5355 Cross Sectional 
Effect 15
CS16 1 0.595458 0.0539 11.04 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 16
CS17 1 -0.50351 0.1238 -4.07 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 17
CS18 1 -0.86718 0.1619 -5.36 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 18
CS19 1 -1.22468 0.0536 -22.84 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 19
CS20 1 0.295502 0.1716 1.72 0.0860 Cross Sectional 
Effect 20
CS21 1 0.948239 0.1934 4.90 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 21
CS22 1 -0.33307 0.4183 -0.80 0.4264 Cross Sectional 
Effect 22
CS23 1 -0.14191 0.1135 -1.25 0.2121 Cross Sectional 
Effect 23
CS24 1 -0.1141 0.0922 -1.24 0.2168 Cross Sectional 
Effect 24
CS25 1 0.126727 0.0749 1.69 0.0917 Cross Sectional 
Effect 25
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CS26 1 -0.82085 0.1041 -7.89 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 26
CS27 1 -2.37855 0.1860 -12.79 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 27
CS28 1 -0.2869 0.3878 -0.74 0.4599 Cross Sectional
Effect 28
CS29 1 -0.61613 0.3813 -1.62 0.1070 Cross Sectional
Effect 29
CS30 1 -0.2775 0.3933 -0.71 0.4809 Cross Sectional 
Effect 30
CS31 1 -1.35967 0.0545 -24.93 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 31
CS32 1 0.269412 0.2780 0.97 0.3332 Cross Sectional 
Effect 32
CS33 1 -0.84517 0.0942 -8.97 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 33
CS34 1 -0.48576 0.0482 -10.08 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 34
CS35 1 -0.302 0.3515 -0.86 0.3909 Cross Sectional 
Effect 35
CS36 1 0.361339 0.1930 1.87 0.0620 Cross Sectional 
Effect 36
CS37 1 -0.0615 0.0474 -1.30 0.1952 Cross Sectional 
Effect 37
CS38 1 -0.12477 0.0641 -1.95 0.0524 Cross Sectional 
Effect 38
CS39 1 0.83835 0.1108 7.57 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 39
CS40 1 -0.10579 0.3693 -0.29 0.7747 Cross Sectional 
Effect 40
CS41 1 0.157546 0.3133 0.50 0.6154 Cross Sectional 
Effect 41
CS42 1 -0.25459 0.3353 -0.76 0.4482 Cross Sectional 
Effect 42
CS43 1 0.623251 0.1186 5.26 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 43
CS44 1 -0.63678 0.4391 -1.45 0.1479 Cross Sectional 
Effect 44
CS45 1 0.483086 0.0936 5.16 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 45
CS46 1 -1.16183 0.0695 -16.72 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 46
CS47 1 0.228609 0.2784 0.82 0.4122 Cross Sectional
Effect 47
CS48 1 -0.00786 0.4771 -0.02 0.9869 Cross Sectional
Effect 48
CS49 1 0.864689 0.0951 9.09 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 49
CS50 1 -2.16713 0.1548 -14.00 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 50
CS51 1 0.347394 0.1800 1.93 0.0545 Cross Sectional 
Effect 51
CS52 1 -2.68725 0.1098 -24.48 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 52
CS53 1 0.187915 0.1598 1.18 0.2405 Cross Sectional 
Effect 53
CS54 1 -0.51547 0.0866 -5.95 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 54
CS55 1 -2.14083 0.1184 -18.08 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 55
CS56 1 -1.70448 0.1004 -16.97 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 56
CS57 1 0.173652 0.3857 0.45 0.6528 Cross Sectional
Effect 57
CS58 1 0.041055 0.3183 0.13 0.8974 Cross Sectional 
Effect 58
CS59 1 -0.29907 0.0492 -6.08 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 59
CS60 1 -1.76047 0.1385 -12.71 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 60
CS61 1 -0.61916 0.0602 -10.29 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 61
CS62 1 -0.47262 0.4217 -1.12 0.2631 Cross Sectional 
Effect 62
CS63 1 -0.34009 0.0471 -7.21 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 63
CS64 1 -1.14758 0.1018 -11.27 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 64
CS65 1 -0.78884 0.1247 -6.33 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 65
CS66 1 -0.57706 0.0746 -7.73 <.0001 Cross Sectional
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CS67 1 0.817087 0.1705 4.79 <.0001
Effect 66 
Cross Sectional
CS68 1 -0.11475 0.2770 -0.41 0.6789
Effect 67 
Cross Sectional
CS69 1 0.849849 0.0928 9.16 <.0001
Effect 68 
Cross Sectional
CS70 1 1.47412 0.1259 11.71 <.0001
Effect 69 
Cross Sectional
CS71 1 -0.93444 0.0446 -20.95 <.0001
Effect 70 
Cross Sectional
CS72 1 0.843716 0.3689 2.29 0.0228
Effect 71 
Cross Sectional
CS73 1 0.726165 0.1737 4.18 <.0001
Effect 72 
Cross Sectional
CS74 1 0.974268 0.1655 5.89 <.0001
Effect 73 
Cross Sectional
CS75 1 -0.12126 0.3113 -0.39 0.6971
Effect 74 
Cross Sectional
CS76 1 -0.89812 0.0570 -15.76 <.0001
Effect 75 
Cross Sectional
CS77 1 -0.79016 0.3936 -2.01 0.0455
Effect 76 
Cross Sectional
CS78 1 -1.03985 0.4465 -2.33 0.0204
Effect 77 
Cross Sectional
CS79 1 -2.10668 0.1223 -17.22 <.0001
Effect 78 
Cross Sectional
CS80 1 0.086787 0.1370 0.63 0.5268
Effect 79 
Cross Sectional
CS81 1 1.736524 0.1882 9.23 <.0001
Effect 80 
Cross Sectional
CS82 1 -0.15757 0.1288 -1.22 0.2221
Effect 81 
Cross Sectional
CS83 1 0.027769 0.1414 0.20 0.8444
Effect 82 
Cross Sectional
CS84 1 -0.09016 0.3433 -0.26 0.7930
Effect 83 
Cross Sectional
CS85 1 0.42223 0.3908 1.08 0.2807
Effect 84 
Cross Sectional
CS86 1 -0.91827 0.2063 -4.45 <.0001
Effect 85 
Cross Sectional
CS87 1 0.693108 0.1506 4.60 <.0001
Effect 86 
Cross Sectional
CS88 1 -0.47555 0.0599 -7.94 <.0001
Effect 87 
Cross Sectional
CS89 1 -1.49585 0.0579 -25.83 <.0001
Effect 88 
Cross Sectional
TSl 1 0.000471 0.0124 0.04 0.9697
Effect 89 
Time Seri es
TS2 1 0.011508 0.0115 1.00 0.3191
Effect 1 
Time Series
TS3 1 0.004779 0.0106 0.45 0.6532
Effect 2 
Time Series
TS4 1 0.00771 0.0105 0.74 0.4627
Effect 3 
Time Seri es
intercept 1 0.384967 0.0557 6.92 <.0001
Effect 4 
intercept
Igdppc 1 0.5284 0.0836 6.32 <.0001
lgdppc2 1 0.03158 0.0211 1.50 0.1355
The TSCSREG Procedure
Dependent Vari able: 1co2pc
Model Description
Estimation Method RanTwo
Number of Cross Sections 90
Time Seri es Length 5
Fit Statistics
SSE 2.4590 DFE 446
MSE 0.0055 Root MSE 0.0743
R-Square 0.5593
Vari ance Component Estimates
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variance Component for Cross Sections 0.35737
Variance Component for Time Series 0
variance Component for Error 0.004923
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects




variable DF Estimate Error t value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 -0.07389 0.0879 -0.84 0.4007
Igdppc 1 0.94051 0.0567 16.57 <.0001
IgdppcZ 1 -0.01104 0.0248 -0.45 0.6557
lgdppc3 1 -0.01246 0.00772 -1.61 0.1072
The TSCSREG Procedure
Dependent Vari able: lco2pc
Model Description
Estimation Method Fi XTWO
Number of Cross Sections 90
Time Series Length 5
Fit Statistics
SSE 1.7378 DFE 353
MSE 0.0049 Root MSE 0. 0702
R-Square 0.9986
F Test for No Fixed Effects
Num DF Den DF F value Pr > F
93 353 336.73 <.0001
Parameter Estimates
Standard
Vari abl e DF Estimate Error t value Pr > |t| Label
CSl 1 -0.47618 0.0668 -7.13 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 1
CS2 1 0.30397 0.1141 2.67 0.0080 Cross Sectional
Effect 2
CS3 1 0.546997 0.3721 1.47 0.1424 Cross Sectional
Effect 3
CS4 1 -0.56254 0.4081 -1.38 0.1689 Cross Sectional
Effect 4
CS5 1 -1.43899 0.0637 -22.58 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 5
CS6 1 0.035692 0.4002 0.09 0.9290 Cross Sectional
Effect 6
CS7 1 -0.36841 0.0650 -5.66 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 7
CS8 1 -0.63586 0.2146 -2.96 0.0032 Cross Sectional
Effect 8
CS9 1 1.157247 0.1021 11.33 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 9
csio 1 -2.08519 0.1067 -19.55 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 10
CSll 1 -2.24348 0.2029 -11.06 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 11
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CS12 1 -2.94092 0.0859 -34.24 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 12
CS13 1 -1.05469 0.0500 -21.09 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 13
CS14 1 0.510218 0.3716 1.37 0.1706 Cross Sectional
Effect 14
CS15 1 -0.17564 0.2387 -0.74 0.4624 Cross Sectional
Effect 15
CS16 1 0.591216 0.0550 10.74 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 16
CS17 1 -0.53315 0.1447 -3.68 0.0003 Cross Sectional 
Effect 17
CS18 1 -0.91006 0.1948 -4.67 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 18
CS19 1 -1.22872 0.0546 -22.49 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 19
CS20 1 0.249699 0.2070 1.21 0.2284 Cross Sectional 
Effect 20
CS21 1 0.896728 0.2331 3.85 0.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 21
CS22 1 -0.36474 0.4263 -0.86 0.3929 Cross Sectional 
Effect 22
CS23 1 -0.1677 0.1309 -1.28 0.2011 Cross Sectional
Effect 23
CS24 1 -0.13186 0.1026 -1.29 0.1996 Cross Sectional 
Effect 24
CS25 1 0.115269 0.0804 1.43 0.1524 Cross Sectional 
Effect 25
CS26 1 -0.84305 0.1183 -7.13 <.0001 Cross Secti onal 
Effect 26
CS27 1 -2.4212 0.2150 -11.26 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 27
CS28 1 -0.32882 0.4023 -0.82 0.4143 Cross Sectional 
Effect 28
CS29 1 -0.65998 0.3974 -1.66 0.0976 Cross Sectional 
Effect 29
CS30 1 -0.31774 0.4066 -0.78 0.4350 Cross Sectional
Effect 30
CS31 1 -1.35839 0.0547 -24.83 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 31
CS32 1 0.209025 0.3172 0.66 0.5104 Cross Sectional
The TSCSREG Procedure 
Dependent Variable: 1co2pc
Parameter Estimates
Vari abl e DF Estimate
Standard
Error t Value Pr > |t | Label
CS33 1 -0.86367 0.1052 -8.21 <.0001 Cross Sectional
CS34 1 -0.48777 0.0485 -10.06 <.0001
Effect 33 
Cross Sectional
CS35 1 -0.35338 0.3750 -0.94 0.3466
Effect 34 
Cross Sectional
CS36 1 0.309948 0.2326 1.33 0.1835
Effect 35 
Cross Sectional
CS37 1 -0.06021 0.0475 -1.27 0.2063
Effect 36 
Cross Sectional
CS38 1 -0.13243 0.0670 -1.98 0.0489
Effect 37 
Cross Sectional
CS39 1 0.81359 0.1273 6.39 <.0001
Effect 38 
Cross Sectional
CS40 1 -0.15275 0.3882 -0.39 0.6942
Effect 39 
Cross Sectional
CS41 1 0.099647 0.3459 0.29 0.7735
Effect 40 
Cross Sectional
CS42 1 -0.3092 0.3628 -0.85 0.3947
Effect 41 
Cross Sectional
CS43 1 0.595578 0.1377 4.33 <.0001
Effect 42 
Cross Sectional
CS44 1 -0.66034 0.4436 -1.49 0.1375
Effect 43 
Cross Sectional
CS45 1 0.464807 0.1044 4.45 <.0001
Effect 44 
Cross Sectional
CS46 1 -1.16215 0.0696 -16.70 <.0001
Effect 45 
Cross Sectional




CS48 1 -0.01431 0.4780 -0.03 0.9761
Effect 47 
Cross Sectional
CS49 1 0.845785 0.1065 7.94 <.0001
Effect 48 
Cross Sectional
CS50 1 -2.19414 0.1692 -12.96 <.0001
Effect 49 
Cross Sectional
CS51 1 0.299227 0.2173 1.38 0.1693
Effect 50 
Cross Sectional
CS52 1 -2.69741 0.1128 -23.91 <.0001
Effect 51 
Cross Sectional
CS53 1 0.145689 0.1921 0.76 0.4488
Effect 52 
Cross Sectional
CS54 1 -0.53115 0.0953 -5.58 <.0001
Effect 53 
Cross Secti onal
CS55 1 -2.15348 0.1228 -17.54 <.0001
Effect 54 
Cross Sectional
CS56 1 -1.71148 0.1021 -16.77 <.0001
Effect 55 
Cross Sectional
CS57 1 0.131108 0.4007 0.33 0.7437
Effect 56 
Cross Sectional
CS58 1 -0.01619 0.3498 -0.05 0.9631
Effect 57 
Cross Sectional
CS59 1 -0.29767 0.0494 -6.03 <.0001
Effect 58 
Cross Sectional
CS60 1 -1.78049 0.1476 -12.06 <.0001
Effect 59 
Cross Sectional
CS61 1 -0.62546 0.0623 -10.04 <.0001
Effect 60 
Cross Sectional
CS62 1 -0.50304 0.4291 -1.17 0.2418
Effect 61 
Cross Sectional
CS63 1 -0.33878 0.0473 -7.16 <.0001
Effect 62 
Cross Sectional
CS64 1 -1.16893 0.1152 -10.14 <.0001
Effect 63 
Cross Sectional
CS65 1 -0.81881 0.1459 -5.61 <.0001
Effect 64 
Cross Sectional
CS66 1 -0.5884 0.0800 -7.36 <.0001
Effect 65 
Cross Secti onal
CS67 1 0.771601 0.2056 3.75 0.0002
Effect 66 
Cross Sectional
CS68 1 -0.17516 0.3163 -0.55 0.5801
Effect 67 
Cross Sectional
CS69 1 0.831883 0.1033 8.05 <.0001
Effect 68 
Cross Sectional
CS70 1 1.443721 0.1474 9.79 <.0001
Effect 69 
Cross Secti onal
CS71 1 -0.93459 0.0447 -20.93 <.0001
Effect 70 
Cross Sectional
CS72 1 0.796484 0.3880 2.05 0.0408
Effect 71 
Cross Sectional
CS73 1 0.679772 0.2095 3.25 0.0013
Effect 72 
Cross Sectional
CS74 1 0.930287 0.1993 4.67 <.0001
Effect 73 
Cross Sectional
CS75 1 -0.17937 0.3443 -0.52 0.6028
Effect 74 
Cross Sectional
CS76 1 -0.90335 0.0586 -15.42 <.0001
Effect 75 
Cross Sectional
CS77 1 -0.83026 0.4068 -2.04 0.0420
Effect 76 
Cross Sectional
CS78 1 -1.06029 0.4500 -2.36 0.0190
Effect 77 
Cross Sectional
CS79 1 -2.12058 0.1274 -16.65 <.0001
Effect 78 
Cross Sectional
CS80 1 0.052323 0.1623 0.32 0.7474
Effect 79 
Cross Sectional
CS81 1 1.686282 0.2270 7.43 <.0001
Effect 80 
Cross Sectional
CS82 1 -0.18907 0.1514 -1.25 0.2127
Effect 81 
Cross Sectional
CS83 1 -0.00826 0.1681 -0.05 0.9609
Effect 82 
Cross Sectional
CS84 1 -0.14327 0.3688 -0.39 0.6979
Effect 83 
Cross Sectional
CS85 1 0.381212 0.4047 0.94 0.3468
Effect 84 
Cross Sectional
CS86 1 -0.97247 0.2476 -3.93 0.0001
Effect 85 
Cross Sectional































































Time Seri es 
Effect 3 
Time Seri es 
Effect 4 
intercept





Number of Cross Sections 90













vari ance Component for Cross Secti ons 0.561143
Variance Component for Time Series 0
variance Component for Error 0.004941































Dependent vari able: 1co2pc
Model Descri ption 
Estimation Method FixTwo
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SSE 1.7490 DFE 354
MSE 0.0049 Root MSE 0.0703
R-Square 0.9986
F Test for No Fixed Effects 
Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F
93 354 532.52 <.0001
Parameter Estimates
Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t value Pr > |t | Label
CSl 1 -0.46952 0.0820 -5.73 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 1
CS2 1 0.31888 0.1077 2.96 0.0033 Cross Sectional 
Effect 2
CS3 1 0.851754 0.3123 2.73 0.0067 Cross Sectional 
Effect 3
CS4 1 -0.19725 0.3433 -0.57 0.5659 Cross Sectional 
Effect 4
CS5 1 -1.39273 0.0742 -18.78 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 5
CS6 1 0.39053 0.3379 1.16 0.2486 Cross Sectional 
Effect 6
CS7 1 -0.37447 0.0635 -5.89 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 7
CS8 1 -0.56315 0.1775 -3.17 0.0016 Cross Sectional
Effect 8
CS9 1 1.171415 0.1045 11.21 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 9
CSlO 1 -1.99585 0.0918 -21.75 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 10
csll 1 -2.02804 0.1461 -13.88 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 11
CS12 1 -2.87152 0.0821 -34.97 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 12
CS13 1 -1.05658 0.0534 -19.79 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 13
CS14 1 0.816413 0.3128 2.61 0.0094 Cross Sectional 
Effect 14
CS15 1 -0.0759 0.1963 -0.39 0.6993 Cross Sectional 
Effect 15
CS16 1 0.590224 0.0599 9.85 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 16
CS17 1 -0.5157 0.1240 -4.16 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 17
CS18 1 -0.84715 0.1631 -5.19 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 18
CS19 1 -1.23326 0.0558 -22.10 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 19
CS20 1 0.335165 0.1791 1.87 0.0621 Cross Sectional
Effect 20
CS21 1 1.011053 0.2006 5.04 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 21
CS22 1 0.027975 0.3572 0.08 0.9376 Cross Sectional
Effect 22
CS23 1 -0.15217 0.1144 -1.33 0.1845 Cross Sectional 
Effect 23
CS24 1 -0.12729 0.0943 -1.35 0.1777 Cross Sectional 
Effect 24
CS25 1 0.121466 0.0876 1.39 0.1663 Cross Sectional 
Effect 25
CS26 1 -0.83703 0.1039 -8.06 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 26
CS27 1 -2.19484 0.1489 -14.74 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 27
CS28 1 0.029079 0.3395 0.09 0.9318 Cross Sectional
Effect 28
CS29 1 -0.31399 0.3336 -0.94 0.3473 Cross Sectional 
Effect 29
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CS30 1 0.042868 0.3411 0.13 0.9001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 30
CS31 1 -1.32738 0.0627 -21.16 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 31
CS32 1 0.427582 0.2652 1.61 0.1078 Cross Sectional 
Effect 32
CS33 1 -0.8656 0.0935 -9.26 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 33
CS34 1 -0.4967 0.0479 -10.38 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 34
CS35 1 -0.04934 0.3132 -0.16 0.8749 Cross Sectional 
Effect 35
CS36 1 0.423656 0.2001 2.12 0.0349 Cross Sectional 
Effect 36
CS37 1 -0.03995 0.0580 -0.69 0.4917 Cross Sectional 
Effect 37
CS38 1 -0.12894 0.0770 -1.67 0.0950 Cross Sectional
Effect 38
CS39 1 0.830134 0.1133 7.33 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 39
CS40 1 0.177145 0.3256 0.54 0.5867 Cross Sectional 
Effect 40
CS41 1 0.361649 0.2895 1.25 0.2125 Cross Sectional 
Effect 41
CS42 1 -0.01532 0.3062 -0.05 0.9601 Cross Sectional 
Effect 42
CS43 1 0.621941 0.1239 5.02 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 43
CS44 1 -0.24545 0.3685 -0.67 0.5058 Cross Sectional 
Effect 44
CS45 1 0.474846 0.1000 4.75 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 45
CS46 1 -1.11619 0.0680 -16.42 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 46
CS47 1 0.388861 0.2662 1.46 0.1449 Cross Sectional 
Effect 47
CS48 1 0.437134 0.3873 1.13 0.2598 Cross Sectional 
Effect 48
CS49 1 0.862453 0.1082 7.97 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 49
CS50 1 -2.02828 0.1262 -16.07 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 50
CS51 1 0.381813 0.1800 2.12 0.0346 Cross Sectional 
Effect 51
CS52 1 -2.60035 0.0952 -27.33 <.0001 Cross Secti onal 
Effect 52
CS53 1 0.201361 0.1602 1.26 0.2095 Cross Sectional 
Effect 53
CS54 1 -0.52647 0.0911 -5.78 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 54
CS55 1 -2.03728 0.1054 -19.32 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 55
CS56 1 -1.61938 0.0951 -17.02 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 56
CS57 1 0.482179 0.3362 1.43 0.1525 Cross Sectional 
Effect 57
CS58 1 0.248918 0.2918 0.85 0.3943 Cross Sectional
Effect 58
CS59 1 -0.28718 0.0487 -5.90 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 59
CS6Q 1 -1.64095 0.1153 -14.23 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 60
CS61 1 -0.63385 0.0599 -10.58 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 61
CS62 1 -0.1074 0.3587 -0.30 0.7648 Cross Sectional 
Effect 62
CS63 1 -0.3152 0.0652 -4.84 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 63
CS64 1 -1.16821 0.1014 -11.52 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 64
CS65 1 -0.79387 0.1260 -6.30 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 65
CS66 1 -0.5922 0.0757 -7.83 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 66
CS67 1 0.853898 0.1766 4.84 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 67
CS68 1 0.04069 0.2638 0.15 0.8775 Cross Sectional 
Effect 68
CS69 1 0.845482 0.1040 8.13 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 69
CS70 1 1.469522 0.1270 11.57 <.0001 Cross Sectional
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Effect 70
CS71 1 -0.92851 0.0524 -17.73 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 71
CS72 1 1.121693 0.3241 3.46 0.0006 Cross Sectional 
Effect 72
CS73 1 0.772222 0.1852 4.17 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 73
CS74 1 0.98872 0.1657 5.97 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 74
CS75 1 0.082461 0.2892 0.29 0.7757 Cross Sectional 
Effect 75
CS76 1 -0.9008 0.0693 -13.00 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 76
CS77 1 -0.46516 0.3432 -1.36 0.1761 Cross Sectional
Effect 77
CS78 1 -0.64299 0.3702 -1.74 0.0833 Cross Sectional
Effect 78
CS79 1 -1.99786 0.1089 -18.35 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 79
CS80 1 0.091745 0.1399 0.66 0.5123 Cross Sectional 
Effect 80
CS81 1 1.784399 0.1894 9.42 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 81
CS82 1 -0.15652 0.1322 -1.18 0.2371 Cross Sectional
Effect 82
CS83 1 0.036264 0.1447 0.25 0.8022 Cross Sectional
Effect 83
CS84 1 0.15563 0.3093 0.50 0.6152 Cross Sectional
Effect 84
CS85 1 0.732789 0.3375 2.17 0.0306 Cross Sectional
Effect 85
CS86 1 -0.85347 0.2048 -4.17 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 86
CS87 1 0.702659 0.1516 4.64 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 87
CS88 1 -0.4353 0.0682 -6.38 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 88
CS89 1 -1.46856 0.0560 -26.24 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 89
TSl 1 -0.00392 0.0121 -0.32 0.7462 Time Seri es
Effect 1
TS2 1 0.008559 0.0114 0.75 0.4539 Time Seri es
Effect 2
TS3 1 0.003842 0.0107 0.36 0.7190 Time Seri es
Effect 3
TS4 1 0.006731 0.0106 0.64 0.5252 Time Series
Effect 4
Intercept 1 0.369944 0.1195 3.10 0.0021 Intercept
Igdppc 
gi ni
1 0.544814 0.0831 6.55 <.0001





Number of Cross Sections 90
Time Seri es Length 5
Fit Statistics
SSE 2.5174 DFE 446
MSE 0.0056 Root MSE 0.0751
R-Square 0.5695
Variance Component Estimates
vari ance Component for Cross Secti ons 0.SB1906
vari ance Component for Time Seri es 0
vari ance Component for Error 0.004924
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects
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The SAS System 
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Dependent Vari able: 1co2pc
Model Description
Estimati on Method FixTwo
Number of Cross Sections 90




































Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Label
-0.45398 0.0825 -5.50 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 1
0.335749 0.1082 3.10 0.0021 Cross Sectional 
Effect 2
0.612271 0.3512 1.74 0.0822 Cross Sectional 
Effect 3
-0.50522 0.4008 -1.26 0.2084 Cross Sectional 
Effect 4
-1.4271 0.0776 -18.40 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 5
0.097024 0.3912 0.25 0.8043 Cross Sectional 
Effect 6
-0.35688 0.0645 -5.53 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 7
-0.59014 0.1781 -3.31 0.0010 Cross Sectional 
Effect 8
1.189021 0.1050 11.32 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 9
-2.07337 0.1055 -19.65 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 10
-2.19302 0.1835 -11.95 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 11
-2.92913 0.0907 -32.29 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 12
-1.04638 0.0537 -19.47 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 13
0.577417 0.3515 1.64 0.1013 Cross Sectional 
Effect 14
-0.12331 0.1986 -0.62 0.5350 Cross Sectional
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CS16 1 0.603043 0.0605 9.98 <.0001
Effect 15 
Cross Sectional
CS17 1 -0.50442 0.1240 -4.07 <.0001
Effect 16 
Cross Sectional
CS18 1 -0.86196 0.1632 -5.28 <.0001
Effect 17 
Cross Sectional
CS19 1 -1.21981 0.0564 -21.61 <.0001
Effect 18 
Cross Sectional
CS20 1 0.310053 0.1796 1.73 0.0851
Effect 19 
Cross Sectional
CS21 1 0.964906 0.2027 4.76 <.0001
Effect 20 
Cross Sectional
CS22 1 -0.31355 0.4247 -0.74 0.4608
Effect 21 
Cross Sectional
CS23 1 -0.13774 0.1147 -1.20 0.2305
Effect 22 
Cross Sectional
CS24 1 -0.10787 0.0950 -1.14 0.2570
Effect 23 
Cross Sectional
CS25 1 0.139703 0.0883 1.58 0.1145
Effect 24 
Cross Sectional
CS26 1 -0.81896 0.1044 -7.84 <.0001
Effect 25 
Cross Sectional
CS27 1 -2.36889 0.1894 -12.50 <.0001
Effect 26 
Cross Sectional
CS28 1 -0.26836 0.3939 -0.68 0.4962
Effect 27 
Cross Sectional
CS29 1 -0.60134 0.3854 -1.56 0.1196
Effect 28 
Cross Sectional
CS30 1 -0.26182 0.3978 -0.66 0.5109
Effect 29 
Cross Sectional
CS31 1 -1.35011 0.0645 -20.94 <.0001
Effect 30 
Cross Sectional
CS32 1 0.282435 0.2823 1.00 0.3178
Effect 31 
Cross Sectional
CS33 1 -0.84506 0.0943 -8.96 <.0001
Effect 32 
Cross Sectional
CS34 1 -0.48644 0.0483 -10.07 <.0001
Effect 33 
Cross Sectional
CS35 1 -0.29331 0.3534 -0.83 0.4071
Effect 34 
Cross Sectional
CS36 1 0.377853 0.2021 1.87 0.0624
Effect 35 
Cross Sectional
CS37 1 -0.05195 0.0585 -0.89 0.3752
Effect 36 
Cross Sectional
CS38 1 -0.11257 0.0777 -1.45 0.1482
Effect 37 
Cross Sectional
CS39 1 0.845016 0.1135 7.44 <.0001
Effect 38 
Cross Sectional
CS40 1 -0.09286 0.3726 -0.25 0.8033
Effect 39 
Cross Sectional
CS41 1 0.16976 0.3167 0.54 0.5923
Effect 40 
Cross Sectional
CS42 1 -0.23837 0.3408 -0.70 0.4847
Effect 41 
Cross Sectional
CS43 1 0.633206 0.1240 5.11 <.0001
Effect 42 
Cross Sectional
CS44 1 -0.61712 0.4453 -1.39 0.1667
Effect 43 
Cross Sectional
CS45 1 0.493243 0.1006 4.90 <.0001
Effect 44 
Cross Sectional
CS46 1 -1.15574 0.0729 -15.85 <.0001
Effect 45 
Cross Sectional
CS47 1 0.242807 0.2834 0.86 0.3922
Effect 46 
Cross Sectional
CS48 1 0.01035 0.4822 0.02 0.9829
Effect 47 
Cross Sectional
CS49 1 0.879257 0.1086 8.09 <.0001
Effect 48 
Cross Sectional
CS50 1 -2.16342 0.1556 -13.91 <.0001
Effect 49 
Cross Sectional
CS51 1 0.351423 0.1809 1.94 0.0528
Effect 50 
Cross Sectional
CS52 1 -2.684 0.1105 -24.29 <.0001
Effect 51 
Cross Sectional
CS53 1 0.189079 0.1601 1.18 0.2384
Effect 52 
Cross Sectional
CS54 1 -0.507 0.0919 -5.52 <.0001
Effect 53 
Cross Sectional





CS56 1 -1.6939 0.1075
CS57 1 0.188544 0.3898
CS58 1 0.050749 0.3206
CS59 1 -0.29995 0.0493
CS60 1 -1.75701 0.1393
CS61 1 -0.61665 0.0609
CS62 1 -0.45365 0.4277
CS63 1 -0.32739 0.0656
CS64 1 -1.14889 0.1021
CS65 1 -0.78422 0.1259
CS66 1 -0.57218 0.0767
CS67 1 0.830094 0.1770
CS68 1 -0.10286 0.2806
CS69 1 0.863227 0.1045
CS70 1 1.478459 0.1270
CS71 1 -0.92686 0.0523
CS72 1 0.853094 0.3709
CS73 1 0.744481 0.1859
CS74 1 0.9725 0.1658
CS75 1 -0.10718 0.3158
CS76 1 -0.8869 0.0698
CS77 1 -0.77109 0.4000
CS78 1 -1.0245 0.4505
CS79 1 -2.09675 0.1276
CS80 1 0.094053 0.1396
CS81 1 1.745145 0.1909
CS82 1 -0.14974 0.1320
CS83 1 0.035716 0.1444
CS84 1 -0.0777 0.3467
CS85 1 0.432779 0.3931
CS86 1 -0.91107 0.2081
CS87 1 0.696732 0.1514
CS88 1 -0.46498 0.0710
CS89 1 -1.49385 0.0584
TSl 1 0.000422 0.0124
TS2 1 0.011398 0.0116
TS3 1 0.004587 0.0107













-15.76 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 56
0.48 0.6289 Cross Sectional
Effect 57
0.16 0.8743 Cross Sectional
Effect 58
-6.08 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 59
-12.62 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 60
-10.13 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 61
-1.06 0.2895 Cross Sectional 
Effect 62
-4.99 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 63
-11.26 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 64
-6.23 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 65
-7.46 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 66
4.69 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 67
-0.37 0.7142 Cross Sectional 
Effect 68
8.26 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 69
11.64 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 70
-17.73 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 71
2.30 0.0220 Cross Sectional 
Effect 72
4.01 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 73
5.87 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 74
-0.34 0.7345 Cross Sectional
Effect 75
-12.70 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 76
-1.93 0.0547 Cross Sectional
Effect 77
-2.27 0.0236 Cross Sectional
Effect 78
-16.44 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 79
0.67 0.5010 Cross Sectional
Effect 80
9.14 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 81
-1.13 0.2575 Cross Sectional
Effect 82
0.25 0.8048 Cross Sectional
Effect 83
-0.22 0.8228 Cross Sectional
Effect 84
1.10 0.2717 Cross Sectional
Effect 85
-4.38 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 86
4.60 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 87
-6.55 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 88
-25.57 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 89
0.03 0.9729 Time Seri es 
Effect 1
0.99 0.3246 Time Series 
Effect 2
0.43 0.6673 Time Seri es 
Effect 3










Estimati on Method RanTwo
Number of Cross Sections 90













variance Component for Cross Sections 0.335163
vari ance Component for Time Seri es 0
Vari ance Component for Error 0.004936
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects
DF m Value Pr > m
3 67.43 <.0001





















Dependent Vari able: 1co2pc
Model Descri ption
Estimation Method FixTwo
Number of Cross Sections 90
Time Seri es Length 5
Fit Statistics
SSE 1.7374 DFE 352
MSE 0.0049 Root MSE 0.0703
R-Square 0.9986
F Test for No Fixed Effects 
Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F
93 352 311.56 <.0001
Parameter Estimates 
Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Label
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CSl 1 -0.46143 0.0847 -5.45 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 1




0.3753 1.49 0.1367 Cross Sectional
Effect 3
CS4 1 -0.54486 0.4134 -1.32 0.1883 Cross Sectional
Effect 4
CS5 1 -1.42641 0.0777 -18.36 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 5
CS6 1 0.054207 0.4060 0.13 0.8939 Cross Sectional
Effect 6
CS7 1 -0.36395 0.0670 -5.43 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 7
CS8 1 -0.6382 0.2150 -2.97 0.0032 Cross Sectional
Effect 8
CS9 1 1.171491 0.1139 10.29 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 9
CSlO 1 -2.08152 0.1076 -19.35 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 10
CSll 1 -2.23157 0.2075 -10.76 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 11
CS12 1 -2.93232 0.0912 -32.16 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 12
CS13 1 -1.04884 0.0541 -19.37 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 13
CS14 1 0.524856 0.3756 1.40 0.1632 Cross Sectional
Effect 14
CS15 1 -0.17645 0.2391 -0.74 0.4609 Cross Sectional
Effect 15
CS16 1 0.598908 0.0614 9.75 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 16
CS17 1 -0.53436 0.1450 -3.69 0.0003 Cross Sectional
Effect 17
CS18 1 -0.90516 0.1958 -4.62 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 18
CS19 1 -1.2238 0.0574 -21.33 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 19
CS20 1 0.264088 0.2133 1.24 0.2166 Cross Sectional
Effect 20
CS21 1 0.913219 0.2405 3.80 0.0002 Cross Sectional
Effect 21
CS22 1 -0.34514 0.4324 -0.80 0.4253 Cross Sectional
Effect 22
CS23 1 -0.1637 0.1318 -1.24 0.2152 Cross Sectional
Effect 23
CS24 1 -0.12568 0.1050 -1.20 0.2322 Cross Sectional
Effect 24
CS25 1 0.128388 0.0928 1.38 0.1674 Cross Sectional
Effect 25
CS26 1 -0.84135 0.1186 -7.10 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 26
CS27 1 -2.41176 0.2178 -11.07 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 27
CS28 1 -0.31033 0.4081 -0.76 0.4475 Cross Sectional
Effect 28
CS29 1 -0.64533 0.4012 -1.61 0.1087 Cross Sectional
Effect 29
CS30 1 -0.30214 0.4108 -0.74 0.4625 Cross Sectional
Effect 30
CS31 1 -1.34863 0.0647 -20.85 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 31
CS32 1 0.221714 0.3208 0.69 0.4899 Cross Sectional
Effect 32
CS33 1 -0.86374 0.1053 -8.20 <.0001 Cross Secti onal
Effect 33
CS34 1 -0.48848 0.0486 -10.05 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 34
CS35 1 -0.34502 0.3766 -0.92 0.3603 Cross Sectional
Effect 35
CS36 1 0.326284 0.2399 1.36 0.1746 Cross Sectional
Effect 36
CS37 1 -0.05046 0.0587 -0.86 0.3905 Cross Sectional
Effect 37
CS38 1 -0.12007 0.0800 -1.50 0.1343 Cross Sectional
Effect 38
CS39 1 0.820146 0.1295 6.33 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 39
CS40 1 -0.14003 0.3912 -0.36 0.7206 Cross Sectional
Effect 40
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CS41 1 0.111535 0.3489 0.32 0.7494 Cross Sectional
Effect 41
CS42 1 -0.2932 0.3676 -0.80 0.4257 Cross Sectional
Effect 42
CS43 1 0.605457 0.1422 4.26 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 43
CS44 1 -0.64052 0.4497 -1.42 0.1552 Cross Sectional
Effect 44
CS45 1 0.474985 0.1106 4.30 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 45
CS46 1 -1.15594 0.0730 -15.83 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 46
CS47 1 0.182221 0.3216 0.57 0.5713 Cross Sectional 
Effect 47
CS48 1 0.004188 0.4830 0.01 0.9931 Cross Sectional
Effect 48
CS49 1 0.860453 0.1185 7.26 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 49
CS50 1 -2.19063 0.1699 -12.89 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 50
CS51 1 0.302864 0.2179 1.39 0.1655 Cross Sectional 
Effect 51
CS52 1 -2.6942 0.1135 -23.73 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 52
CS53 1 0.146464 0.1924 0.76 0.4471 Cross Sectional 
Effect 53
CS54 1 -0.52266 0.1000 -5.23 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 54
CS55 1 -2.14428 0.1271 -16.87 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 55
CS56 1 -1.70075 0.1090 -15.61 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 56
CS57 1 0.145876 0.4046 0.36 0.7187 Cross Sectional 
Effect 57
CS58 1 -0.00687 0.3518 -0.02 0.9844 Cross Sectional
Effect 58
CS59 1 -0.29856 0.0495 -6.03 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 59
CS60 1 -1.77716 0.1482 -11.99 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 60
CS61 1 -0.62297 0.0630 -9.89 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 61
CS62 1 -0.484 0.4348 -1.11 0.2664 Cross Sectional
Effect 62
CS63 1 -0.32582 0.0658 -4.95 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 63
CS64 1 -1.17048 0.1155 -10.13 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 64
CS65 1 -0.81439 0.1469 -5.54 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 65
CS66 1 -0.58353 0.0819 -7.13 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 66
CS67 1 0.784418 0.2108 3.72 0.0002 Cross Sectional 
Effect 67
CS68 1 -0.16362 0.3193 -0.51 0.6087 Cross Sectional 
Effect 68
CS69 1 0.845348 0.1138 7.43 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 69
CS70 1 1.447848 0.1483 9.76 <.0001 Cross Secti onal 
Effect 70
CS71 1 -0.92686 0.0523 -17.71 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 71
CS72 1 0.805585 0.3899 2.07 0.0395 Cross Sectional 
Effect 72
CS73 1 0.697994 0.2194 3.18 0.0016 Cross Sectional 
Effect 73
CS74 1 0.928054 0.1997 4.65 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 74
CS75 1 -0.16558 0.3482 -0.48 0.6347 Cross Sectional 
Effect 75
CS76 1 -0.89196 0.0710 -12.56 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 76
CS77 1 -0.81121 0.4128 -1.96 0.0502 Cross Sectional
Effect 77
CS78 1 -1.04484 0.4539 -2.30 0.0219 Cross Sectional
Effect 78
CS79 1 -2.11059 0.1323 -15.95 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 79
CS80 1 0.059395 0.1644 0.36 0.7182 Cross Sectional
Effect 80
CS81 1 1.69458 0.2291 7.40 <.0001 Cross Sectional
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CS82 1 -0.18139 0.1540
CS83 1 -0.0005 0.1706
CS84 1 -0.13108 0.3718
CS85 1 0.391567 0.4069
CS86 1 -0.96567 0.2491
CS87 1 0.657226 0.1808
CS88 1 -0.46398 0.0711
CS89 1 -1.49276 0.0586
TSl 1 -0.00009 0.0125
TS2 1 0.011223 0.0116
TS3 1 0.004485 0.0107

















-1.18 0.2397 Cross Sectional
Effect 82
-0.00 0.9976 Cross Sectional
Effect 83
-0.35 0.7246 Cross Sectional
Effect 84
0.96 0.3365 Cross Sectional
Effect 85
-3.88 0.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 86
3.63 0.0003 Cross Sectional
Effect 87
-6.53 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 88
-25.49 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 89
-0.01 0.9946 Time Seri es 
Effect 1
0.97 0.3330 Time Series 
Effect 2
0.42 0.6747 Time Seri es 
Effect 3







3- Model 1 with variables in levels:
The TSCSREG Procedure
Dependent Vari able: co2pc
Model Descri ption
Estimation Method RanTwo
Number of Cross Sections 90













Vari ance Component for Cross Sections 17.07848
vari ance Component for Time Seri es 0.00064
Variance Component for Error 0.135671
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Number of Cross Sections 90












































Estimate Error t value Pr > |t| Label
-0.27392 0.2333 -1.17 0.2412 Cross Sectional 
Effect 1
1.288182 0.2358 5.46 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 2
11.60576 0.7646 15.18 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 3
-2.34626 1.0709 -2.19 0.0291 Cross Sectional 
Effect 4
-0.8399 0.2331 -3.60 0.0004 Cross Sectional 
Effect 5
4.222531 0.9974 4.23 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 6
-0.2182 0.2333 -0.94 0.3502 Cross Sectional 
Effect 7
-0.30802 0.2661 -1.16 0.2478 Cross Sectional
Effect 8
4.569655 0.2349 19.46 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 9
-0.92156 0.2333 -3.95 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 10
-0.92013 0.2334 -3.94 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 11
-0.98428 0.2332 -4.22 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 12
-0.72031 0.2330 -3.09 0.0022 Cross Sectional
Effect 13
10.84542 0.7613 14.25 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 14
1.004779 0.2870 3.50 0.0005 Cross Sectional 
Effect 15
1.226545 0.2331 5.26 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 16
-0.19725 0.2397 -0.82 0.4111 Cross Sectional
Effect 17
-0.72057 0.2547 -2.83 0.0049 Cross Sectional
Effect 18
-0.79075 0.2331 -3.39 0.0008 Cross Sectional 
Effect 19
2.356134 0.2613 9.02 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 20
7.678002 0.2813 27.30 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 21
-1.04299 1.2520 -0.83 0.4054 Cross Sectional 
Effect 22
0.363841 0.2376 1.53 0.1266 Cross Sectional
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CS24 1 0.261781 0.2349 i . n 0.2658
Effect 23 
Cross Sectional
CS25 1 0.535964 0.2337 2.29 0.0224
Effect 24 
Cross Sectional
CS26 1 -0.57439 0.2362 -2.43 0.0155
Effect 25 
Cross Sectional
CS27 1 -0.92875 0.2335 -3.98 <.0001
Effect 26 
Cross Sectional
CS28 1 -0.08969 1.0169 -0.09 0.9298
Effect 27 
Cross Sectional
CS29 1 -2.70282 0.9718 -2.78 0.0057
Effect 28 
Cross Sectional
CS30 1 -0.07213 1.0562 -0.07 0.9456
Effect 29 
Cross Sectional
CS31 1 -0.82226 0.2330 -3.53 0.0005
Effect 30 
Cross Sectional
CS32 1 4.459586 0.4610 9.67 <.0001
Effect 31 
Cross Sectional
CS33 1 -0.59311 0.2351 -2.52 0.0121
Effect 32 
Cross Sectional
CS34 1 -0.39105 0.2330 -1.68 0.0942
Effect 33 
Cross Sectional
CS35 1 0.150315 0.7866 0.19 0.8486
Effect 34 
Cross Sectional
CS36 1 3.131817 0.2810 11.15 <.0001
Effect 35 
Cross Sectional
CS37 1 -0.12953 0.2330 -0.56 0.5786
Effect 36 
Cross Sectional
CS38 1 0.06121 0.2333 0.26 0.7932
Effect 37 
Cross Sectional
CS39 1 3.412227 0.2371 14.39 <.0001
Effect 38 
Cross Sectional
CS40 1 1.870371 0.8958 2.09 0.0375
Effect 39 
Cross Sectional
CS41 1 4.113829 0.5948 6.92 <.0001
Effect 40 
Cross Sectional
CS42 1 0.609176 0.6991 0.87 0.3841
Effect 41 
Cross Sectional
CS43 1 2.637095 0.2385 11.06 <.0001
Effect 42 
Cross Sectional
CS44 1 -4.70468 1.4355 -3.28 0.0012
Effect 43 
Cross Sectional
CS45 1 1.625213 0.2350 6.92 <.0001
Effect 44 
Cross Sectional
CS46 1 -0.77566 0.2331 -3.33 0.0010
Effect 45 
Cross Sectional
CS47 1 4.103007 0.4631 8.86 <.0001
Effect 46 
Cross Sectional
CS48 1 3.282021 1.8277 1.80 0.0734
Effect 47 
Cross Sectional
CS49 1 3.100785 0.2352 13.18 <.0001
Effect 48 
Cross Sectional
CS50 1 -0.91995 0.2334 -3.94 <.0001
Effect 49 
Cross Sectional
CS51 1 2.795153 0.2680 10.43 <.0001
Effect 50 
Cross Sectional
CS52 1 -0.96102 0.2333 -4.12 <.0001
Effect 51 
Cross Sectional
CS53 1 1.719595 0.2535 6.78 <.0001
Effect 52 
Cross Sectional
CS54 1 -0.29818 0.2344 -1.27 0.2042
Effect 53 
Cross Sectional
CS55 1 -0.92372 0.2333 -3.96 <.0001
Effect 54 
Cross Sectional
CS56 1 -0.88144 0.2332 -3.78 0.0002
Effect 55 
Cross Sectional
CS57 1 5.666659 1.0023 5.65 <.0001
Effect 56 
Cross Sectional
CS58 1 3.062115 0.6173 4.96 <.0001
Effect 57 
Cross Sectional
CS59 1 -0.34275 0.2330 -1.47 0.1422
Effect 58 
Cross Sectional
CS60 1 -0.88619 0.2334 -3.80 0.0002
Effect 59 
Cross Sectional
CS61 1 -0.45303 0.2332 -1.94 0.0529
Effect 60 
Cross Sectional
CS62 1 -2.58144 1.2802 -2.02 0.0445
Effect 61 
Cross Sectional





CS64 1 -0.81464 0.2359 -3.45 0.0006 Cross Sectional 
Effect 64
CS65 1 -0.55213 0.2399 -2.30 0.0219 Cross Sectional 
Effect 65
CS66 1 -0.38601 0.2337 -1.65 0.0995 Cross Sectional 
Effect 66
CS67 1 5.43127 0.2605 20.85 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 67
CS68 1 1.547435 0.4576 3.38 0.0008 Cross Sectional 
Effect 68
CS69 1 2.942318 0.2349 12.52 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 69
CS70 1 8.796628 0.2402 36.62 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 70
CS71 1 -0.67426 0.2330 -2.89 0.0040 Cross Sectional 
Effect 71
CS72 1 18.7961 0.8907 21.10 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 72
CS73 1 4.872181 0.2628 18.54 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 73
CS74 1 6.449272 0.2570 25.10 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 74
CS75 1 1.655204 0.5865 2.82 0.0050 Cross Sectional 
Effect 75
CS76 1 -0.63925 0.2331 -2.74 0.0064 Cross Sectional 
Effect 76
CS77 1 -4.19864 1.0591 -3.96 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 77
CS78 1 -8.13323 1.5063 -5.40 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 78
CS79 1 -0.92009 0.2333 -3.94 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 79
CS80 1 1.092472 0.2434 4.49 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 80
CS81 1 19.2182 0.2758 69.67 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 81
CS82 1 0.422956 0.2409 1.76 0.0800 Cross Sectional
Effect 82
CS83 1 0.973818 0.2449 3.98 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 83
CS84 1 1.993443 0.7410 2.69 0.0075 Cross Sectional 
Effect 84
CS85 1 10.22424 1.0381 9.85 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 85
CS86 1 -1.01553 0.2976 -3.41 0.0007 Cross Sectional
Effect 86
CS87 1 3.873672 0.2488 15.57 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 87
CS88 1 -0.48903 0.2331 -2.10 0.0366 Cross Sectional 
Effect 88
CS89 1 -0.85315 0.2330 -3.66 0.0003 Cross Sectional
Effect 89
TSl 1 -0.01493 0.0608 -0.25 0.8062 Time Seri es 
Effect 1
TS2 1 -0.07143 0.0575 -1.24 0.2152 Time Seri es 
Effect 2
TS3 1 -0.07327 0.0552 -1.33 0.1853 Time Seri es 
Effect 3
TS4 1 0.033498 0.0550 0.61 0.5428 Time Seri es 
Effect 4
intercept 1 0.972049 0.1709 5.69 <.0001 intercept
gdppc 1 0.29119 0.0325 8.95 <.0001
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The TSCSREG Procedure
Dependent vari able: co2pc
Model Descri ption
Estimati on Method RanTwo
Number of Cross Sections 90
Time Seri es Length 5
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Fit Statistics
SSE 61.6358 DFE 447
MSE 0.1379 Root MSE 0.3713
R-Square 0.3171
variance Component Estimates
Variance Component for Cross Sections 14.99648
Vari ance Component for Time Series 0.000518
Vari ance Component for Error 0.135634
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects




variable DF Estimate Error t value Pr > |t|
intercept 1 1.838717 0.4990 3.68 0.0003
gdppc 1 0.400694 0.0482 8.32 <.0001
gdppc2 1 -0.00178 0.000795 -2.24 0.0255
The TSCSREG Procedure
Dependent Vari able: co2pc
Model Description
Estimati on Method FixTWO
Number of Cross Sections 90
Time Seri es Length 5
Fit Statistics
SSE 48.0143 DFE 354
MSE 0.1356 Root MSE 0. 3683
R-Square 0.9968
F Test for No Fixed Effects
Num DF Den DF F value Pr > F
93 354 518.38 <.0001
Parameter Estimates
Standard
Variable DF Estimate Error t value Pr > |t| Label
CSl 1 -0.3043 0.2351 -1.29 0.1964 Cross Sectional
Effect 1
CS2 1 1.204828 0.2488 4.84 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 2
CS3 1 10.45381 1.3386 7.81 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 3
CS4 1 -3.6578 1.6467 -2.22 0.0270 Cross Sectional
Effect 4
CSS 1 -0.82258 0.2336 -3.52 0.0005 Cross Sectional
Effect 5
CS6 1 2.92996 1.5858 1.85 0.0655 Cross Sectional
Effect 6
CS7 1 -0.24653 0.2348 -1.05 0.2945 Cross Sectional
Effect 7
CS8 1 -0.591 0.3790 -1.56 0.1198 Cross Sectional
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CS9 1 4.500971 0.2438 18.46 <.0001
Effect 8 
Cross Sectional
csio 1 -0.8941 0.2347 -3.81 0.0002
Effect 9 
Cross Sectional
CSll 1 -0.88454 0.2359 -3.75 0.0002
Effect 10 
Cross Sectional
CS12 1 -0.96063 0.2342 -4.10 <.0001
Effect 11 
Cross Sectional
CS13 1 -0.73221 0.2333 -3.14 0.0018
Effect 12 
Cross Sectional
CS14 1 9.696808 1.3341 7.27 <.0001
Effect 13 
Cross Sectional
CS15 1 0.642689 0.4490 1.43 0.1532
Effect 14 
Cross Sectional
CS16 1 1.208474 0.2337 5.17 <.0001
Effect 15 
Cross Sectional
CS17 1 -0.32538 0.2690 -1.21 0.2273
Effect 16 
Cross Sectional
CS18 1 -0.95011 0.3359 -2.83 0.0049
Effect 17 
Cross Sectional
CS19 1 -0.80817 0.2336 -3.46 0.0006
Effect 18 
Cross Sectional
CS20 1 2.094559 0.3613 5.80 <.0001
Effect 19 
Cross Sectional
CS21 1 7.335809 0.4309 17.03 <.0001
Effect 20 
Cross Sectional
CS22 1 -2.3524 1.7684 -1.33 0.1843
Effect 21 
Cross Sectional
CS23 1 0.256964 0.2585 0.99 0.3209
Effect 22 
Cross Sectional
CS24 1 0.192707 0.2439 0.79 0.4300
Effect 23 
Cross Sectional
CS25 1 0.491796 0.2375 2.07 0.0391
Effect 24 
Cross Sectional
CS26 1 -0.66327 0.2509 -2.64 0.0086
Effect 25 
Cross Sectional
CS27 1 -0.89263 0.2360 -3.78 0.0002
Effect 26 
Cross Sectional
CS28 1 -1.38788 1.6023 -0.87 0.3870
Effect 27 
Cross Sectional
CS29 1 -3.98572 1.5626 -2.55 0.0112
Effect 28 
Cross Sectional
CS30 1 -1.3814 1.6355 -0.84 0.3989
Effect 29 
Cross Sectional
CS31 1 -0.80905 0.2333 -3.47 0.0006
Effect 30 
Cross Sectional
CS32 1 3.695048 0.8627 4.28 <.0001
Effect 31 
Cross Sectional
CS33 1 -0.66529 0.2449 -2.72 0.0069
Effect 32 
Cross Sectional
CS34 1 -0.40087 0.2332 -1.72 0.0864
Effect 33 
Cross Sectional
CS35 1 -1.01984 1.3655 -0.75 0.4556
Effect 34 
Cross Sectional
CS36 1 2.790796 0.4298 6.49 <.0001
Effect 35 
Cross Sectional
CS37 1 -0.12171 0.2331 -0.52 0.6018
Effect 36 
Cross Sectional
CS38 1 0.030857 0.2351 0.13 0.8956
Effect 37 
Cross Sectional
CS39 1 3.310716 0.2561 12.93 <.0001
Effect 38 
Cross Sectional
CS40 1 0.630591 1.4835 0.43 0.6710
Effect 39 
Cross Sectional
CS41 1 3.145804 1.0984 2.86 0.0044
Effect 40 
Cross Sectional
CS42 1 -0.48058 1.2527 -0.38 0.7015
Effect 41 
Cross Sectional
CS43 1 2.520251 0.2633 9.57 <.0001
Effect 42 
Cross Sectional
CS44 1 -5.9414 1.8579 -3.20 0.0015
Effect 43 
Cross Sectional
CS45 1 1.553965 0.2446 6.35 <.0001
Effect 44 
Cross Sectional
CS46 1 -0.75627 0.2338 -3.23 0.0013
Effect 45 
Cross Sectional
CS47 1 3.335616 0.8662 3.85 0.0001
Effect 46 
Cross Sectional





CS49 1 3.026395 0.2456 12.32 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 49
CS50 1 -0.88624 0.2356 -3.76 0.0002 Cross Sectional
Effect 50
CS51 1 2.503945 0.3860 6.49 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 51
CS52 1 -0.93291 0.2348 -3.97 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 52
CS53 1 1.496459 0.3310 4.52 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 53
CS54 1 -0.35865 0.2414 -1.49 0.1382 Cross Sectional 
Effect 54
CSS 5 1 -0.89417 0.2350 -3.81 0.0002 Cross Sectional 
Effect 55
CS56 1 -0.85471 0.2346 -3.64 0.0003 Cross Sectional
Effect 56
CS57 1 4.373472 1.5894 2.75 0.0062 Cross Sectional
Effect 57
CS58 1 2.065741 1.1333 1.82 0.0692 Cross Sectional
Effect 58
CS59 1 -0.33317 0.2331 -1.43 0.1539 Cross Sectional
Effect 59
CS6Q 1 -0.8541 0.2353 -3.63 0.0003 Cross Sectional
Effect 60
CS61 1 -0.47854 0.2344 -2.04 0.0420 Cross Sectional
Effect 61
CS62 1 -3.88444 1.7842 -2.18 0.0301 Cross Sectional
Effect 62
CS63 1 -0.35288 0.2331 -1.51 0.1309 Cross Sectional
Effect 63
CS64 1 -0.89957 0.2494 -3.61 0.0004 Cross Sectional
Effect 64
CS65 1 -0.68218 0.2700 -2.53 0.0120 Cross Sectional
Effect 65
CS66 1 -0.42971 0.2374 -1.81 0.0711 Cross Sectional
Effect 66
CS67 1 5.173458 0.3582 14.44 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 67
CS68 1 0.788833 0.8561 0.92 0.3575 Cross Sectional
Effect 68
CS69 1 2.872332 0.2442 11.76 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 69
CS70 1 8.663443 0.2717 31.88 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 70
CS71 1 -0.67619 0.2329 -2.90 0.0039 Cross Sectional
Effect 71
CS72 1 17.55309 1.4830 11.84 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 72
CS73 1 4.603612 0.3670 12.54 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 73
CS74 1 6.208255 0.3448 18.01 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 74
CS75 1 0.698533 1.0848 0.64 0.5200 Cross Sectional
Effect 75
CS76 1 -0.66092 0.2340 -2.82 0.0050 Cross Sectional
Effect 76
CS77 1 -5.50708 1.6368 -3.36 0.0009 Cross Sectional
Effect 77
CS78 1 -9.32171 1.8851 -4.94 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 78
CS79 1 -0.88997 0.2350 -3.79 0.0002 Cross Sectional
Effect 79
CS80 1 0.933138 0.2869 3.25 0.0013 Cross Sectional
Effect 80
CS81 1 18.89617 0.4128 45.77 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 81
CS82 1 0.283332 0.2753 1.03 0.3041 Cross Sectional
Effect 82
CS83 1 0.803285 0.2940 2.73 0.0066 Cross Sectional
Effect 83
CS84 1 0.862653 1.3086 0.66 0.5102 Cross Sectional
Effect 84
CS85 1 8.918896 1.6211 5.50 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 85
CS86 1 -1.41205 0.4813 -2.93 0.0036 Cross Sectional
Effect 86
CS87 1 3.677716 0.3112 11.82 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 87
CS88 1 -0.47328 0.2335 -2.03 0.0434 Cross Sectional
Effect 88
CS89 1 -0.83823 0.2334 -3.59 0.0004 Cross Sectional
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TSl 1 -0.00178 0.0621 -0.03 0.9772
Effect 89 
Ti me Seri es
TS2 1 -0.06209 0.0582 -1.07 0.2868
Effect 1 
Time Seri es
TS3 1 -0.06896 0.0554 -1.25 0.2137
Effect 2 
Time Seri es
TS4 1 0.03617 0.0550 0.66 0.5115
Effect 3 
Time Seri es
intercept 1 0.921705 0.1775 5.19 <.0001
Effect 4 
intercept
gdppc 1 0.368335 0.0805 4.58 <.0001





Number of Cross Sections 90













Variance Component for Cross Sections 12.8767
variance Component for Time Seri es 0.000309
Variance Component for Error 0.123848










































Number of Cross Sections 
Time Series Length
Fit statisties
SSE 43.7185 DFE 353
MSE 0.1238 Root MSE 0.3519
R-Square 0.9971
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F Test for No Fixed Effects 
Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F
93 353 482.26 <.0001
Parameter Estimates
vari abl e DF Estimate
Standard
Error
csl 1 -0.63631 0.2316
CS2 1 0.305951 0.2825
CS3 1 2.648795 1.8419
CS4 1 -10.6477 1.9710
CSS 1 -0.63112 0.2256
CS6 1 -4.35377 1.9560
CS7 1 -0.5564 0.2305
CS8 1 -3.48046 0.6098
CS9 1 3.75764 0.2650
CS10 1 -0.58982 0.2301
csll 1 -0.48942 0.2352
CS12 1 -0.69893 0.2282
CS13 1 -0.86305 0.2240
CS14 1 1.894987 1.8385
CS15 1 -2.96772 0.7483
CS16 1 1.010374 0.2258
CS17 1 -1.69115 0.3462
CS18 1 -3.33005 0.5161
CS19 1 -0.99924 0.2256
CS20 1 -0.59253 0.5721
CS21 1 3.90328 0.7136
CS22 1 -8.54333 1.9901
CS23 1 -0.88843 0.3144
CS24 1 -0.55491 0.2654
CS25 1 0.0107 0.2412
CS26 1 -1.62039 0.2896
CS27 1 -0.4916 0.2355
CS28 1 -8.59486 1.9601
CS29 1 -11.3608 1.9488
CS30 1 -8.43449 1.9689
CS31 1 -0.66323 0.2243
CS32 1 -2.87382 1.3870
CS33 1 -1.44594 0.2690
CS34 1 -0.50887 0.2235
CS35 1 -8.80958 1.8580
t Value Pr > |t| Label
-2.75 0.0063 Cross Sectional 
Effect 1
1.08 0.2796 Cross Sectional 
Effect 2
1.44 0.1513 Cross Sectional 
Effect 3
-5.40 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 4
-2.80 0.0054 Cross Sectional 
Effect 5
-2.23 0.0267 Cross Sectional 
Effect 6
-2.41 0.0163 Cross Sectional 
Effect 7
-5.71 <.0001 Cross Secti onal
Effect 8
14.18 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 9
-2.56 0.0108 Cross Sectional 
Effect 10
-2.08 0.0381 Cross Secti onal 
Effect 11
-3.06 0.0024 Cross Sectional 
Effect 12
-3.85 0.0001 Cross Secti onal 
Effect 13
1.03 0.3034 Cross Sectional 
Effect 14
-3.97 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 15
4.47 <.0001 Cross Secti onal 
Effect 16
-4.88 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 17
-6.45 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 18
-4.43 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 19
-1.04 0.3011 Cross Sectional 
Effect 20
5.47 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 21
-4.29 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 22
-2.83 0.0050 Cross Secti onal
Effect 23
-2.09 0.0373 Cross Sectional 
Effect 24
0.04 0.9646 Cross Sectional 
Effect 25
-5.59 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 26
-2.09 0.0376 Cross Sectional 
Effect 27
-4.39 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 28
-5.83 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 29
-4.28 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 30
-2.96 0.0033 Cross Sectional 
Effect 31
-2.07 0.0390 Cross Sectional
-5.38 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 33
-2.28 0.0234 Cross Sectional 
Effect 34
-4.74 <.0001 Cross Sectional
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Effect 35
CS36 1 -0.63001 0.7114 -0.89 0.3764 Cross Sectional
Effect 36
CS37 1 -0.03555 0.2232 -0.16 0.8735 Cross Sectional 
Effect 37
CS38 1 -0.30095 0.2316 -1.30 0.1946 Cross Sectional
Effect 38
CS39 1 2.221257 0.3068 7.24 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 39
CS40 1 -6.93385 1.9129 -3.62 0.0003 Cross Sectional 
Effect 40
CS41 1 -4.35111 1.6498 -2.64 0.0087 Cross Sectional 
Effect 41
CS42 1 -8.25719 1.7823 -4.63 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 42
CS43 1 1.271095 0.3290 3.86 0.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 43
CS44 1 -11.4349 2.0055 -5.70 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 44
CS45 1 0.783211 0.2679 2.92 0.0037 Cross Sectional 
Effect 45
CS46 1 -0.5419 0.2264 -2.39 0.0172 Cross Sectional 
Effect 46
CS47 1 -3.23848 1.3896 -2.33 0.0203 Cross Sectional 
Effect 47
CS48 1 -3.37873 2.1463 -1.57 0.1163 Cross Sectional
Effect 48
CS49 1 2.222742 0.2715 8.19 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 49
CS50 1 -0.51218 0.2339 -2.19 0.0292 Cross Secti onal 
Effect 50
CS51 1 -0.46211 0.6242 -0.74 0.4596 Cross Sectional
Effect 51
CS52 1 -0.62135 0.2305 -2.70 0.0074 Cross Secti onal 
Effect 52
CS53 1 -0.82119 0.5049 -1.63 0.1047 Cross Sectional 
Effect 53
CS54 1 -1.01459 0.2561 -3.96 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 54
CSS 5 1 -0.56659 0.2313 -2.45 0.0148 Cross Secti onal
Effect 55
CS56 1 -0.55851 0.2297 -2.43 0.0156 Cross Sectional 
Effect 56
CS57 1 -2.88694 1.9561 -1.48 0.1409 Cross Sectional 
Effect 57
CS58 1 -5.5149 1.6821 -3.28 0.0011 Cross Sectional
Effect 58
CS59 1 -0.2275 0.2235 -1.02 0.3094 Cross Sectional 
Effect 59
CS60 1 -0.49813 0.2328 -2.14 0.0331 Cross Sectional 
Effect 60
CS61 1 -0.75774 0.2290 -3.31 0.0010 Cross Sectional 
Effect 61
CS62 1 -9.95349 1.9921 -5.00 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 62
CS63 1 -0.26925 0.2232 -1.21 0.2284 Cross Sectional
Effect 63
CS64 1 -1.81509 0.2845 -6.38 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 64
CS65 1 -2.06766 0.3492 -5.92 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 65
CS66 1 -0.90586 0.2408 -3.76 0.0002 Cross Sectional 
Effect 66
CS67 1 2.522049 0.5655 4.46 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 67
CS68 1 -5.74644 1.3786 -4.17 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 68
CS69 1 2.115054 0.2664 7.94 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 69
CS70 1 7.246273 0.3540 20.47 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 70
CS71 1 -0.69751 0.2226 -3.13 0.0019 Cross Sectional 
Effect 71
CS72 1 9.935615 1.9186 5.18 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 72
CS73 1 1.850173 0.5844 3.17 0.0017 Cross Sectional 
Effect 73
CS74 1 3.717494 0.5361 6.93 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 74
CS75 1 -6.75557 1.6360 -4.13 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 75
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CS76 1 -0.89837 0.2272 -3.95 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 76
CS77 1 -12.5437 1.9682 -6.37 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 77
CS78 1 -14.6448 2.0154 -7.27 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 78
CS79 1 -0.55598 0.2316 -2.40 0.0169 Cross Sectional 
Effect 79
CS80 1 -0.75092 0.3961 -1.90 0.0588 Cross Secti onal
Effect 80
CS81 1 15.64698 0.6782 23.07 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 81
CS82 1 -1.20022 0.3642 -3.30 0.0011 Cross Secti onal
Effect 82
CS83 1 -0.99377 0.4148 -2.40 0.0171 Cross Sectional 
Effect 83
CS84 1 -6.94373 1.8223 -3.81 0.0002 Cross Sectional
Effect 84
CS85 1 1.791102 1.9658 0.91 0.3628 Cross Sectional 
Effect 85
CS86 1 -5.3207 0.8074 -6.59 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 86
CS87 1 1.627343 0.4578 3.55 0.0004 Cross Sectional
Effect 87
CS88 1 -0.29925 0.2251 -1.33 0.1845 Cross Sectional
Effect 88
CS89 1 -0.6734 0.2248 -3.00 0.0029 Cross Sectional
Effect 89
TSl 1 0.039521 0.0597 0.66 0.5086 Time Seri es 
Effect 1
TS2 1 -0.02473 0.0560 -0.44 0.6590 Time Seri es 
Effect 2
TS3 1 -0.05414 0.0530 -1.02 0.3073 Ti me Seri es 
Effect 3
TS4 1 0.040426 0.0526 0.77 0.4427 Time Seri es 
Effect 4
Intercept 1 0.407583 0.1907 2.14 0.0333 Intercept
gdppc 1 1.236004 0.1662 7.44 <.0001
gdppc2 1 -0.02904 0.00485 -5.99 <.0001
gdppc3 1 0.000257 0.000044 5.89 <.0001





Number of Cross Sections 90
Ti me Seri es Length 5
Fit Statistics
SSE 60.4944 DFE 447
MSE 0.1353 Root MSE 0.3679
R-Square 0.3013
Variance Component Estimates
variance Component for Cross Sections 17.23409
Variance Component for Time Seri es 0.000604
variance Component for Error 0.135818
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects




vari abl e DF Estimate
Standard
Error t value Pr > |t|
intercept 1 2.010849 0.6212 3.24 0.0013
gdppc 1 0.303673 0.0219 13.87 <.0001
gi ni 1 0.006827 0.00978 0.70 0.4857





Estimation Method FixTwo 
Number of Cross Sections 90 
Time Seri es Length 5
Fit statistics
SSE 48.0797 DFE
MSE 0.1358 Root MSE 0.
R-Square 0.9968
F Test for No Fixed Effects 
Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F 
93 354 594.83 <.0001
Parameter Estimates 
Standard




CSl 1 -0.05654 0.3622 -0.16 0.8760 Cross Sectional
CS2 1 1.45029 0.3135 4.63 <.0001
Effect 1 
Cross Sectional
CS3 1 11.8036 0.8055 14.65 <.0001
Effect 2 
Cross Sectional
CS4 1 -2.07153 1.1271 -1.84 0.0669
Effect 3 
Cross Sectional
CS5 1 -0.66076 0.3263 -2.03 0.0436
Effect 4 
Cross Sectional
CS6 1 4.50777 1.0620 4.24 <.0001
Effect 5 
Cross Secti onal
CS7 1 -0.15032 0.2489 -0.60 0.5463
Effect 6 
Cross Sectional
CS8 1 -0.33444 0.2684 -1.25 0.2135
Effect 7 
Cross Sectional
CS9 1 4.781681 0.3580 13.36 <.0001
Effect 8 
Cross Sectional
csio 1 -0.87541 0.2407 -3.64 0.0003
Effect 9 
Cross Sectional
csll 1 -0.75934 0.3107 -2.44 0.0150
Effect 10 
Cross Sectional
CS12 1 -0.86506 0.2784 -3.11 0.0020
Effect 11 
Cross Sectional
CS13 1 -0.63371 0.2579 -2.46 0.0145
Effect 12 
Cross Sectional
CS14 1 11.06995 0.8136 13.61 <.0001
Effect 13 
Cross Sectional
CS15 1 1.00052 0.2872 3.48 0.0006
Effect 14 
Cross Sectional
CS16 1 1.340465 0.2747 4.88 <.0001
Effect 15 
Cross Sectional
CS17 1 -0.20824 0.2402 -0.87 0.3866
Effect 16 
Cross Sectional
CS18 1 -0.64207 0.2738 -2.35 0.0196
Effect 17 
Cross Sectional
CS19 1 -0.71707 0.2514 -2.85 0.0046
Effect 18 
Cross Sectional




CS21 1 7.924943 0.4221 18.77 <.0001
Effect 20 
Cross Sectional
CS22 1 -0.73634 1.3121 -0.56 0.5750
Effect 21 
Cross Sectional
CS23 1 0.428214 0.2515 1.70 0.0895
Effect 22 
Cross Sectional
CS24 1 0.35679 0.2643 1.35 0.1780
Effect 23 
Cross Sectional
CS25 1 0.730594 0.3408 2.14 0.0327
Effect 24 
Cross Sectional
CS26 1 -0.54382 0.2395 -2.27 0.0238
Effect 25 
Cross Sectional
CS27 1 -0.80439 0.2822 -2.85 0.0046
Effect 26 
Cross Sectional
CS28 1 0.195613 1.0804 0.18 0.8564
Effect 27 
Cross Sectional
CS29 1 -2.47425 1.0149 -2.44 0.0153
Effect 28 
Cross Sectional
CS30 1 0.171949 1.1015 0.16 0.8760
Effect 29 
Cross Sectional
CS31 1 -0.68294 0.2930 -2.33 0.0203
Effect 30 
Cross Sectional
CS32 1 4.652026 0.5223 8.91 <.0001
Effect 31 
Cross Sectional
CS33 1 -0.58883 0.2352 -2.50 0.0128
Effect 32 
Cross Sectional
CS34 1 -0.3999 0.2334 -1.71 0.0875
Effect 33 
Cross Sectional
CS35 1 0.284126 0.8053 0.35 0.7244
Effect 34 
Cross Sectional
CS36 1 3.376505 0.4198 8.04 <.0001
Effect 35 
Cross Sectional
CS37 1 0.0107 0.2937 0.04 0.9710
Effect 36 
Cross Sectional
CS38 1 0.244089 0.3298 0.74 0.4597
Effect 37 
Cross Sectional
CS39 1 3.513527 0.2701 13.01 <.0001
Effect 38 
Cross Sectional
CS40 1 2.069543 0.9315 2.22 0.0269
Effect 39 
Cross Sectional
CS41 1 4.29601 0.6388 6.73 <.0001
Effect 40 
Cross Sectional
CS42 1 0.852497 0.7651 1.11 0.2659
Effect 41 
Cross Sectional
CS43 1 2.786951 0.3056 9.12 <.0001
Effect 42 
Cross Sectional
CS44 1 -4.39022 1.4911 -2.94 0.0035
Effect 43 
Cross Sectional
CS45 1 1.778307 0.3055 5.82 <.0001
Effect 44 
Cross Sectional
CS46 1 -0.68958 0.2577 -2.68 0.0078
Effect 45 
Cross Secti onal
CS47 1 4.312908 0.5350 8.06 <.0001
Effect 46 
Cross Sectional
CS48 1 3.588196 1.8698 1.92 0.0558
Effect 47 
Cross Sectional
CS49 1 3.31914 0.3643 9.11 <.0001
Effect 48 
Cross Sectional
CS50 1 -0.87965 0.2391 -3.68 0.0003
Effect 49 
Cross Sectional
CS51 1 2.855431 0.2790 10.24 <.0001
Effect 50 
Cross Secti onal
CS52 1 -0.92187 0.2387 -3.86 0.0001
Effect 51 
Cross Sectional
CS53 1 1.738162 0.2548 6.82 <.0001
Effect 52 
Cross Sectional
CS54 1 -0.16997 0.2858 -0.59 0.5524
Effect 53 
Cross Sectional
CS55 1 -0.79827 0.2829 -2.82 0.0050
Effect 54 
Cross Sectional
CS56 1 -0.73256 0.3007 -2.44 0.0153
Effect 55 
Cross Sectional
CS57 1 5.897618 1.0451 5.64 <.0001
Effect 56 
Cross Sectional
CS58 1 3.207363 0.6447 4.97 <.0001
Effect 57 
Cross Sectional
CS59 1 -0.35727 0.2339 -1.53 0.1275
Effect 58 
Cross Sectional





CS61 1 -0.41384 0.2386 -1.73 0.0837 Cross Sectional 
Effect 61
CS62 1 -2.28209 1.3364 -1.71 0.0886 Cross Sectional 
Effect 62
CS63 1 -0.17349 0.3333 -0.52 0.6030 Cross Sectional 
Effect 63
CS64 1 -0.83137 0.2370 -3.51 0.0005 Cross Sectional 
Effect 64
CS65 1 -0.48135 0.2564 -1.88 0.0613 Cross Sectional 
Effect 65
CS66 1 -0.31112 0.2526 -1.23 0.2188 Cross Sectional 
Effect 66
CS67 1 5.624776 0.3587 15.68 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 67
CS68 1 1.723141 0.5096 3.38 0.0008 Cross Sectional 
Effect 68
CS69 1 3.143084 0.3474 9.05 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 69
CS70 1 8.863188 0.2549 34.78 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 70
CS71 1 -0.56165 0.2737 -2.05 0.0409 Cross Sectional
Effect 71
CS72 1 18.94253 0.9105 20.80 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 72
CS73 1 5.144177 0.4350 11.83 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 73
CS74 1 6.424222 0.2591 24.79 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 74
CS75 1 1.864916 0.6448 2.89 0.0041 Cross Sectional
Effect 75
CS76 1 -0.47135 0.3165 -1.49 0.1373 Cross Sectional 
Effect 76
CS77 1 -3.90432 1.1241 -3.47 0.0006 Cross Sectional
Effect 77
CS78 1 -7.88033 1.5411 -5.11 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 78
CS79 1 -0.78352 0.2911 -2.69 0.0075 Cross Sectional 
Effect 79
CS80 1 1.202086 0.2807 4.28 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 80
CS81 1 19.34618 0.3205 60.35 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 81
CS82 1 0.54118 0.2842 1.90 0.0577 Cross Sectional
Effect 82
CS83 1 1.09339 0.2885 3.79 0.0002 Cross Secti onal
Effect 83
CS84 1 2.182077 0.7794 2.80 0.0054 Cross Sectional 
Effect 84
CS85 1 10.39187 1.0604 9.80 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 85
CS86 1 -0.90919 0.3271 -2.78 0.0057 Cross Sectional
Effect 86
CS87 1 3.928964 0.2587 15.19 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 87
CS88 1 -0.33546 0.3044 -1.10 0.2712 Cross Sectional
Effect 88
CS89 1 -0.82629 0.2357 i uu U1 0.0005 Cross Sectional 
Effect 89
TSl 1 -0.01638 0.0609 -0.27 0.7880 Time Seri es 
Effect 1
TS2 1 -0.07353 0.0576 -1.28 0.2028 Ti me Seri es
Effect 2
TS3 1 -0.07631 0.0554 -1.38 0.1691 Time Seri es
Effect 3
TS4 1 0.028237 0.0554 0.51 0.6107 Time Seri es 
Effect 4
intercept 1 0.534454 0.5831 0.92 0.3600 intercept
gdppc 
gi ni
1 0.289548 0.0326 8.88 <.0001
1 0.00795 0.0101 0.79 0.4330
The TSCSREG Procedure
Dependent vari able: co2pc
Model Description
Estimation Method RanTwo
Number of Cross Sections 90
70
Time Seri es Length 5
Fit Statistics
SSE 61.3934 DFE 446
MSE 0.1377 Root MSE 0.3710
R-Square 0.3184
variance Component Estimates
Vari ance Component for Cross Secti ons 15.1583
Variance Component for Time Seri es 0.000474
Vari ance Component for Error 0.135739
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects




vari abl e DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
intercept 1 1.436299 0.6535 2.20 0.0285
gdppc 1 0.406023 0.0486 8.36 <.0001
gdppcZ 1 -0.00187 0.000801 -2.33 0.0201
gi ni 1 0.009484 0.00991 0.96 0.3389
The TSCSREG Procedure
Dependent Vari able: C02pc
Model Descri ption
Estimation Method 
Number of Cross Sections 















F Test for No Fixed Effects






Vari abl e DF Estimate
Standard











































CS7 1 -0.1742 0.2498 -0.70 0.4860
Effect 6 
Cross Sectional
CS8 1 -0.63396 0.3825 -1.66 0.0983
Effect 7 
Cross Sectional
CS9 1 4.727915 0.3612 13.09 <.0001
Effect 8 
Cross Sectional
csio 1 -0.84256 0.2424 -3.48 0.0006
Effect 9 
Cross Sectional
CSll 1 -0.70803 0.3141 -2.25 0.0248
Effect 10 
Cross Sectional
CS12 1 -0.82989 0.2801 -2.96 0.0033
Effect 11 
Cross Sectional
CS13 1 -0.63871 0.2579 -2.48 0.0137
Effect 12 
Cross Sectional
CS14 1 9.882971 1.3524 7.31 <.0001
Effect 13 
Cross Sectional
CS15 1 0.619832 0.4500 1.38 0.1693
Effect 14 
Cross Sectional
CS16 1 1.331358 0.2747 4.85 <.0001
Effect 15 
Cross Sectional
CS17 1 -0.34378 0.2700 -1.27 0.2037
Effect 16 
Cross Sectional
CS18 1 -0.87636 0.3470 -2.53 0.0120
Effect 17 
Cross Sectional
CS19 1 -0.72898 0.2515 -2.90 0.0040
Effect 18 
Cross Secti onal
CS20 1 2.316473 0.4455 5.20 <.0001
Effect 19 
Cross Sectional
CS21 1 7.586924 0.5222 14.53 <.0001
Effect 20 
Cross Sectional
CS22 1 -2.0851 1.7967 -1.16 0.2466
Effect 21 
Cross Sectional
CS23 1 0.321535 0.2695 1 = 19 0.2337
Effect 22 
Cross Sectional
CS24 1 0.292472 0.2707 1.08 0.2806
Effect 23 
Cross Secti onal
CS25 1 0.70107 0.3418 2.05 0.0410
Effect 24 
Cross Secti onal
CS26 1 -0.63452 0.2532 -2.51 0.0127
Effect 25 
Cross Sectional
CS27 1 -0.75568 0.2856 -2.65 0.0085
Effect 26 
Cross Sectional
CS28 1 -1.14321 1.6285 -0.70 0.4831
Effect 27 
Cross Sectional
CS29 1 -3.80192 1.5780 -2.41 0.0165
Effect 28 
Cross Sectional
CS30 1 -1.18208 1.6528 -0.72 0.4750
Effect 29 
Cross Sectional
CS31 1 -0.65699 0.2939 -2.24 0.0260
Effect 30 
Cross Sectional
CS32 1 3.865675 0.8860 4.36 <.0001
Effect 31 
Cross Sectional
CS33 1 -0.66427 0.2450 -2.71 0.0070
Effect 32 
Cross Sectional
CS34 1 -0.41098 0.2335 -1.76 0.0793
Effect 33 
Cross Sectional
CS35 1 -0.93334 1.3698 -0.68 0.4961
Effect 34 
Cross Sectional
CS36 1 3.039521 0.5198 5.85 <.0001
Effect 35 
Cross Sectional
CS37 1 0.031066 0.2942 0.11 0.9160
Effect 36 
Cross Sectional
CS38 1 0.228057 0.3300 0.69 0.4900
Effect 37 
Cross Sectional
CS39 1 3.415685 0.2843 12.01 <.0001
Effect 38 
Cross Sectional
CS40 1 0.784607 1.4951 0.52 0.6001
Effect 39 
Cross Sectional
CS41 1 3.295038 1.1127 2.96 0.0033
Effect 40 
Cross Sectional
CS42 1 -0.27103 1.2771 -0.21 0.8321
Effect 41 
Cross Sectional
CS43 1 2.677212 0.3214 8.33 <.0001
Effect 42 
Cross Sectional
CS44 1 -5.66194 1.8873 -3.00 0.0029
Effect 43 
Cross Sectional
CS45 1 1.716739 0.3105 5.53 <.0001
Effect 44 
Cross Sectional





CS47 1 3.525073 0.8946 3.94 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 47
CS48 1 2.738515 2.0230 1.35 0.1767 Cross Sectional
Effect 48
CS49 1 3.259929 0.3682 8.85 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 49
CS50 1 -0.84075 0.2416 -3.48 0.0006 Cross Sectional
Effect 50
CS51 1 2.554786 0.3907 6.54 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 51
CS52 1 -0.88895 0.2405 -3.70 0.0003 Cross Sectional 
Effect 52
CS53 1 1.505401 0.3313 4.54 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 53
CS54 1 -0.22237 0.2897 -0.77 0.4432 Cross Sectional 
Effect 54
CS55 1 -0.75636 0.2854 -2.65 0.0084 Cross Sectional 
Effect 55
CS56 1 -0.69157 0.3029 -2.28 0.0230 Cross Sectional 
Effect 56
CS57 1 4.55934 1.6049 2.84 0.0048 Cross Sectional 
Effect 57
CS58 1 2.173415 1.1407 1.91 0.0576 Cross Sectional
Effect 58
CS59 1 -0.34846 0.2339 -1.49 0.1372 Cross Sectional 
Effect 59
CS60 1 -0.81038 0.2409 -3.36 0.0009 Cross Sectional 
Effect 60
CS61 1 -0.43724 0.2395 -1.83 0.0688 Cross Sectional 
Effect 61
CS62 1 -3.62474 1.8107 -2.00 0.0461 Cross Sectional 
Effect 62
CS63 1 -0.14931 0.3339 -0.45 0.6550 Cross Sectional 
Effect 63
CS64 1 -0.92203 0.2509 -3.68 0.0003 Cross Sectional 
Effect 64
CS65 1 -0.61181 0.2825 -2.17 0.0310 Cross Sectional 
Effect 65
CS66 1 -0.35053 0.2550 -1.37 0.1701 Cross Sectional 
Effect 66
CS67 1 5.370754 0.4267 12.59 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 67
CS68 1 0.941574 0.8750 1.08 0.2826 Cross Sectional 
Effect 68
CS69 1 3.086974 0.3510 8.79 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 69
CS70 1 8.729067 0.2825 30.90 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 70
CS71 1 -0.55391 0.2737 -2.02 0.0437 Cross Sectional 
Effect 71
CS72 1 17.64964 1.4879 11.86 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 72
CS73 1 4.885659 0.4944 9.88 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 73
CS74 1 6.168899 0.3480 17.73 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 74
CS75 1 0.878256 1.1055 0.79 0.4275 Cross Sectional
Effect 75
CS76 1 -0.47956 0.3165 -1.52 0.1306 Cross Sectional 
Effect 76
CS77 1 -5.25312 1.6644 -3.16 0.0017 Cross Sectional 
Effect 77
CS78 1 -9.10673 1.9026 -4.79 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 78
CS79 1 -0.74005 0.2937 -2.52 0.0122 Cross Sectional 
Effect 79
CS80 1 1.04423 0.3153 3.31 0.0010 Cross Sectional
Effect 80
CS81 1 19.01903 0.4375 43.48 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 81
CS82 1 0.404773 0.3101 1.31 0.1927 Cross Sectional
Effect 82
CS83 1 0.924635 0.3268 2.83 0.0049 Cross Sectional
Effect 83
CS84 1 1.010705 1.3206 0.77 0.4446 Cross Sectional
Effect 84
CS85 1 9.035329 1.6275 5.55 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 85
CS86 1 -1.31646 0.4944 -2.66 0.0081 Cross Sectional 
Effect 86
CS87 1 3.727935 0.3168 11.77 <.0001 Cross Sectional
73
CS88 1 -0.3056 0.3055
CS89 1 -0.80828 0.2362
TSl 1 -0.00269 0.0621
TS2 1 -0.0639 0.0583
TS3 1 -0.07204 0.0555


















-1.00 0.3178 Cross Sectional
Effect 88
-3.42 0.0007 Cross Sectional
Effect 89
-0.04 0.9654 Time Seri es 
Effect 1
-1.10 0.2736 Time Seri es 
Effect 2
-1.30 0.1951 Time Seri es 
Effect 3







Dependent vari able: co2pc
Model Descri ption
Estimation Method RanTwo
Number of Cross Sections 90
Ti me Seri es Length 5
Fit statistics
SSE 56.9739 DFE 445
MSE 0.1280 Root MSE 0.3578
R-Square 0.3817
Variance Component Estimates
vari ance Component for Cross Secti ons 13.00181
vari ance Component for Time Seri es 0.000283
vari ance Component for Error 0.123828
Hausman Test for 
Random Effects
DF m value Pr > m
4




















Dependent vari able: co2pc
The TSCSREG Procedure
Model Descri ption
Estimati on Method FixTwo
Number of Cross Sections 90
Time Seri es Length 5
Fit Statistics
74
SSE 43.5873 DFE 352
MSE 0.1238 Root MSE 0.3519
R-Square 0.9971
F Test for No Fixed Effects 
Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F
93 352 481.61 <.0001
Parameter Estimates
Standard
Vari abl e DF Estimate Error t value Pr > |t| Label
CSl 1 -0.36665 0.3497 -1.05 0.2951 Cross Sectional 
Effect 1
CS2 1 0.500858 0.3401 1.47 0.1417 Cross Sectional 
Effect 2
CS3 1 2.798239 1.8474 1.51 0.1308 Cross Sectional 
Effect 3
CS4 1 -10.4077 1.9845 i U1 r\j 4̂ <.0001 Cross Secti onal 
Effect 4
CS5 1 -0.40454 0.3152 -1.28 0.2001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 5
CS6 1 -4.1007 1.9712 -2.08 0.0382 Cross Sectional 
Effect 6
CS7 1 -0.47414 0.2439 -1.94 0.0527 Cross Sectional 
Effect 7
CS8 1 -3.54185 0.6127 -5.78 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 8
CS9 1 4.016673 0.3654 10.99 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 9
csio 1 -0.52907 0.2376 -2.23 0.0266 Cross Sectional 
Effect 10
csll 1 -0.28398 0.3084 -0.92 0.3578 Cross Sectional 
Effect 11
CS12 1 -0.54688 0.2718 -2.01 0.0450 Cross sectional 
Effect 12
CS13 1 -0.75561 0.2471 -3.06 0.0024 Cross Sectional 
Effect 13
CS14 1 2.078136 1.8469 1.13 0.2613 Cross Sectional 
Effect 14
CS15 1 -3.00884 0.7493 -4.02 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 15
CS16 1 1.151467 0.2642 4.36 <.0001 Cross Secti onal 
Effect 16
CS17 1 -1.71796 0.3471 -4.95 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 17
CS18 1 -3.2546 0.5212 -6.24 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 18
CS19 1 -0.90858 0.2422 -3.75 0.0002 Cross Sectional 
Effect 19
CS20 1 -0.34724 0.6197 -0.56 0.5756 Cross Sectional 
Effect 20
CS21 1 4.179255 0.7622 5.48 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 21
CS22 1 -8.25991 2.0089 -4.11 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 22
CS23 1 -0.81854 0.3216 -2.54 0.0114 Cross Sectional 
Effect 23
CS24 1 -0.44276 0.2869 -1.54 0.1236 Cross Sectional 
Effect 24
CS25 1 0.250398 0.3352 0.75 0.4556 Cross Sectional 
Effect 25
CS26 1 -1.59109 0.2910 -5.47 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 26
CS27 1 -0.33181 0.2821 -1.18 0.2402 Cross Sectional 
Effect 27
CS28 1 -8.34172 1.9753 -4.22 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 28
CS29 1 -11.1786 1.9566 -5.71 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 29
CS30 1 -8.23309 1.9785 -4.16 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 30
CS31 1 -0.48704 0.2822 -1.73 0.0852 Cross sectional 
Effect 31







































































































































































CS74 1 3.661887 0.5388
CS75 1 -6.57844 1.6449
CS76 1 -0.68991 0.3044
CS77 1 -12.2792 1.9848
CS78 1 -14.4183 2.0272
CS79 1 -0.3815 0.2870
CS8Q 1 -0.6295 0.4133
CS81 1 15.7756 0.6896
CS82 1 -1.06603 0.3868
CS83 1 -0.86097 0.4343
CS84 1 -6.80461 1.8271
CS85 1 1.896479 1.9683
CS86 1 -5.22625 0.8126
CS87 1 1.67697 0.4603
CS88 1 -0.10492 0.2938
CS89 1 -0.63815 0.2274
TSl 1 0.038633 0.0597
TS2 1 -0.02666 0.0560
TS3 1 -0.05764 0.0531

















6.80 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 74
-4.00 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 75
-2.27 0.0240 Cross Sectional
Effect 76
-6.19 <.0001 Cross Sectional
Effect 77
-7.11 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 78
-1.33 0.1847 Cross Sectional 
Effect 79
-1.52 0.1286 Cross Sectional
Effect 80
22.88 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 81
-2.76 0.0062 Cross Sectional
Effect 82
-1.98 0.0482 Cross Sectional
Effect 83
-3.72 0.0002 Cross Sectional 
Effect 84
0.96 0.3359 Cross Sectional 
Effect 85
-6.43 <.0001 Cross Sectional 
Effect 86
3.64 0.0003 Cross Sectional 
Effect 87
-0.36 0.7212 Cross Sectional 
Effect 88
-2.81 0.0053 Cross Sectional 
Effect 89
0.65 0.5182 Time Seri es 
Effect 1
-0.48 0.6344 Time Seri es 
Effect 2
-1.09 0.2781 Time Seri es 
Effect 3
0.64 0.5214 Time Series 
Effect 4
-0.26 0.7976 intercept
7.47 <.0001
-6.02 <.0001
5.91 <.0001
1.03 0.3040
77
